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DNA DATABASE SEARCHES AND THE
LEGAL CONSUMPTION OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
Peter Donnelly*
and
Richard D. Friedman**
DNA evidence has transformed the proof of identity in criminal
litigation, but it has also introduced daunting problems of statistical
analysis into the process. In this Article, we analyze a problem re-
lated to DNA evidence that is likely to be of great and increasing
significance in the near future. This is the problem of whether, and
how, to present evidence that the suspect has been identified
through a DNA database search. In our view, the two well-known
reports on DNA evidence issued by the National Research Council
("NRC"), each of which has carried great authority with the Ameri-
can courts on various issues, have been badly mistaken in their
analysis of this problem. Similar errors affect the analyses of schol-
ars who have supported the NRC reports. We will also offer some
reflections on the habits of mind, of both lawyers and statisticians,
that may have led to this result. Finally, we will suggest an ap-
proach that legal decisionmakers might take in general with respect
to scientific and statistically-based evidence to avoid this kind of
difficulty. This approach is significantly different from that which
pervades the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 and its recent sequel, General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,2 as well as their precursor, Frye v. United States.3 And the
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suggested approach sheds a helpful light on a case now pending
before the Court, Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc.4
In Part I of this Article, we summarize the nature of DNA evi-
dence and explain the database search problem. We contrast two
types of cases. In both, a sample containing DNA has been left,
assertedly by the defendant, at the scene of the crime or some other
material location. And in both, the defendant's DNA matches that
of the crime sample. But the two cases are different in at least one
critical respect. In the first case, what we will call the "confirmation
case," other evidence has made the defendant a suspect and so war-
ranted testing his DNA. In the other, what we will call the "trawl
case," the DNA match itself made the defendant a suspect, and the
match was discovered only by searching through a database of pre-
viously obtained DNA samples.
The confirmation case has been the model for most uses of
DNA evidence up to now. But the creation of broad databases con-
tainng profiles of past offenders, or even of those suspected of
crime, means that the trawl case will become increasingly important
over the coming years.5 The development of such a database is
quite advanced in England and Wales. As of October 1998, the
English database held 360,000 entries, had matched 28,000 people
to crime scenes, and had made 6,000 links between crime scenes.6
In the last few years, such databases have developed rapidly in the
United States as well, and recently, to considerable fanfare, the FBI
began operation of what is in effect a national database. 7
In Part II, we discuss the NRC's analyses of the question of
whether and how the DNA evidence should be presented in the
trawl case, and we present our own contrasting analysis. The first
NRC report ("NRC I")8 opposed admission of the evidence alto-
4. 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. Klumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmi-
chael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
5. See Carey Goldberg, DNA Databanks Giving Police a Powerfid Weapon, and Critics,
N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. 19, 1998, at Al:
Of all the new thrills that DNA analysis offers forensic scientists, nothing seems to beat
what they call a "cold hit": when a computer discovers the identity of a killer or rapist
by matching DNA from blood, semen or saliva left at a crime scene with a DNA profile
in a database. A criminal is fingered by his own genes.
Until now, cold hits have come sporadically, mainly in several states where DNA
forensic work is most advanced, totaling about 200 nationwide. But Federal and state
experts say they will soon be cropping up much more often.
6. See Nicholas Wade, F.B.L Set to Open Its DNA Database for Fighting Crime, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1998, at Al; see also infra text accompanying note 27.
7. See Wade, supra note 6.
8. COMMrrrEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FoRENsIc SCIENCE, NATIONAL REsEARCH
COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC ScIENCE (1992) [hereinafter NRC I].
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gether. NRC I proposed that a match discovered after a database
search should provide the basis for performing further tests on a
new sample taken from the suspect identified by the match, but that
the evidence of the initial match should not be presented to the
jury.9 The second NRC report ("NRC II")10 takes a substantially
more generous view, but still calls for a testifying expert to drasti-
cally understate the value of the evidence.
In our view, the caution reflected in the NRC reports and in the
analyses of those who have taken a similar perspective on the prob-
lem'" is unwarranted. The fact that the DNA match was found only
after a search, possibly of many thousands of samples, does not di-
minish the value of the evidence; on the contrary, the fact that other
potential suspects have been eliminated as possible sources of the
crime sample slightly raises the value of the evidence. No down-
ward adjustment in the force of the evidence is appropriate. In-
deed, we will show that the confirmation case and the trawl case are
really poles of a continuum, and that the analysis of the two cases is
fundamentally the same. It may well be that the total weight of the
evidence is less in the trawl case than in the confirmation case -
both because there may be less inculpatory evidence in the trawl
case' 2 and because the identification of the defendant in that case
may taint any later-developed evidence by suggestiveness. But this
is an entirely different matter, and one that can be left to the ordi-
nary process of argument to the jury; it does not require any rules
restricting the force ascribed to the DNA evidence or the manner in
which that evidence is presented. 3
9. Id. at 124, 129.
10. CoMMrrrnE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Tim
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996) [hereinafter NRC II].
11. See N.E. Morton, The Forensic DNA Endgame, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 477,487-92 (1997);
Anders Stockmarr, Likelihood ratios for evaluating DNA evidence when the suspect is found
through a database search (Research Rept. 98/1, Dept. of Biostatistics, University of Copen-
hagen) (to be published, in slightly revised form, in Biometrics (Sept. 1999)); Aidan Sudbury,
Comment to David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly, Inference in Forensic Identification, 158 J.
ROYAL STAT. Socy. A, Part 1, at 21,48-49 (1995); cf. Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars:
Skirmishing with NRC 11, 37 JuriUmp~ecs J. 439, 461-62 (1997) [hereinafter Lempert, After
the DNA Wars] (endorsing NRC I and criticizing NRC II with respect to database searches);
Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With
Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARUozo L. REV. 303, 333-34 (1§91) [hereinafter
Lempert, Some Caveats] (anticipating NRC I and proposing retesting requirement).
12. Indeed, it may be that most of the non-DNA evidence in the trawl case is exculpatory.
See, e.g., Regina v. Adams, [1998) 1 Crim. App. 377 (Eng. C.A. 1997), discussed infra note 74.
13. The arguments made here are consistent with, but fuller in some respects than, those
made in LAN W. Evzrr & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL
GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 219-22 (1998); David J. Balding, Errors and Misunder-
standings in the Second NRC Report, 37 JtIMeETmcs J. 469 (1997); David J. Balding & Peter
Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence When the Suspect Is Identified Through a
February 1999]
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In Part III, we argue that the difficulty manifested by the NRC
reports has arisen in part from the tendency of statisticians to ex-
port to the legal context methods that were developed to assist sci-
entific inquiries and that appear more suitable in that context than
in adjudication. But part of the problem also arises from the ten-
dency of courts to defer to the scientific establishment with respect
to matters of scientific evidence. We suggest that the solution lies
less in a "gatekeeping" role of the type prescribed by Frye, as well
as by Daubert and Joiner, designed to keep out disreputable evi-
dence purporting to be scientific, and more in the role of aggressive
consumer. When courts allow experts to present evidence in court,
it is to perform a service for the legal system. The courts should try
to ensure that the experts are doing so in a way designed to serve
the needs of that system and not bound by their own professional
habits.
I. DNA EVIDENCE AND THE DATABASE SEARCH PROBLEM
To understand the problem addressed by this Article, it is neces-
sary to understand some aspects of DNA evidence - but, merci-
fully, only some of the less technical ones. 14
A. The Nature of DNA Evidence
DNA is a remarkably complex type of molecule that is some-
times said to contain the genetic blueprint of life. DNA is con-
tained in the nucleus of virtually all cells of every living organism,
and within a given organism, the DNA is effectively the same from
cell to cell.15 The entirety of an individual organism's DNA is re-
ferred to as its genome. In humans, the genome consists of two
collections, one inherited from each parent, of about three billion
building blocks, called bases.'6 Human DNA is extremely similar
Database Search, 41 J. FORENSIC Sci. 603 (1996) [hereinafter Balding & Donnelly, Evaluating
DNA Profile Evidence]; David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly, Inference in Forensic Identifica-
tion, 158 J. ROYAL STAT. Socy. A, Part 1, at 21, 29 (1995) [hereinafter Balding & Donnelly,
Inference in Forensic Identification]; A.P. Dawid & J. Mortera, Coherent Analysis of Forensic
Identification Evidence, 58 J. ROYAL STAT. Socy. B, 425 (1996).
14. For helpful descriptions of the underlying genetics of DNA evidence, see NRC II,
supra note 10, at 12-14, 70-74.
15. Sperm and eggs contain only half the DNA that is in an organism's other cells.
16. The description here applies only to nuclear DNA. Mitochondrial DNA, found in the
energy-producing material surrounding the nucleus, is inherited solely from the mother, and
(apart from possible mutations) all offspring of the same mother share the same mitochon-
drial DNA. For this reason, among others, most forensic DNA testing is done on nuclear
DNA, though mitochondrial DNA can be useful when the trace evidence has little or no
nuclear DNA. See Mark Hansen, A Comeback for Hair Evidence, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at
66.
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across individuals. This shared genetic material is what makes us
human and distinguishes us from other life forms. At a multitude
of sites in the genome, however, there are variations from one
human to another; typically, two unrelated individuals will differ at
about one site in a thousand. These variations are what make
humans genetically different from each other. Except for identical
twins, no two humans have DNA that is identical throughout the
whole genome.
The consistency of DNA throughout a given person's body, and
the uniqueness of a given person's DNA, are what make DNA evi-
dence so valuable for identification purposes. In determining
whether the DNA from two separate samples comes from the same
person, it is not possible given the current state of science to com-
pare them over the whole genome. Current testing techniques use
several markers. Each marker targets a particular place, or locus,
on the genome. For DNA profiling techniques, loci are chosen that
display considerable variability among individuals. In most current
methods, this variability is manifested by differences in the length,
measured by the number of bases or the number of times a given
sequence repeats, between pre-specified locations. This procedure
will yield two measurements for each sample for each locus, one for
the father's side and one for the mother's side.17
In most modem profiling systems - including the systems used
in the databases that are of concern here - the length of DNA
fragments can be measured precisely. In comparing two samples at
a given locus, if the pair of measurements from one sample is the
same as the pair of measurements from the other, the profiles are
said to match at that locus; otherwise, they are said not to match at
that locus.' 8 If the two profiles match at each of the loci examined,
the proffles are said to match. If the profiles fail to match at one or
more loci, then the profiles do not match, and it is virtually certain
- putting aside, as we do throughout this Article, the possibility of
laboratory error' 9-that the samples do not-come from the same
person.
17. If, however, the individual is homozygous at a given locus, meaning that the mea-
sured fragments from the mother's and father's sides are the same length, then in some pro-
filing systems only a single measurement, of the common fragment length, will be returned.
18. In older systems, length measurements are only approximate, and the proffiles are said
to match at a given locus if the pairs of measurements from each are sufficiently close - that
is, if they fall within some pre-specified tolerance of each other. There is thus a slight chance
that, even if two samples from the same source are measured properly, the test results will
nevertheless be sufficiently different that the samples will be declared not to match.
19. This possibility can never be eliminated. We discuss lab error further below. See
infra note 57.
February 1999]
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Our concern here is with the case in which the profiles do
match. 20 A match does not mean that the two samples must abso-
lutely have come from the same source; all that can be said is that,
so far as the test was able to determine, the two samples were iden-
tical, but it is possible for more than one person to have the same
profile as indicated by a test even of several loci. At any given lo-
cus, the percentage of people having DNA fragments of a given
length, in terms of base pairs, is small but not infinitesimal. DNA
tests gain their power from the conjunction of matches at each of
several loci; it is extremely rare for two samples taken from unre-
lated individuals to show such congruence over many loci.
But just how rare? That question must be addressed if the
strength of the DNA match is to be assessed. Databases of DNA
samples from various populations have been collected, and from
these it is possible to estimate how common any given fragment
length is at a given locus. It is typically assumed that the measure-
ments yielded by each of the markers used in forensic DNA profil-
ing are independent of one another.21 This assumption enables a
forensic scientist to multiply probabilities. This multiplication can
yield very low estimates of the probability that a given innocent
person from the demographic group described by the database
would have a DNA profile matching the profile common to both of
these samples. Figures in the range of one in millions down to one
in many billions are typical of profiling systems now in use.
So far so good; there are complexities and controversies in the
process we have described,22 but they are not our concern here, and
20. There are theoretical objections to this aspect of the standard approach in the systems
that depend on approximate measurement, for the criteria for determining a match are nec-
essarily arbitrary. See, e.g., BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAtiX, INTERPRETING Evi-
DENCE: EVALUATING FORENSic SCIENCE iN THE COURTROOM 115-20 (1995); D.A. Berry ct
al., Statistical Inference in Crime Investigations Using Deoxyribonucleic Acid Profiling, 41
APPLiED STAT. 499 (1992). A more theoretically satisfactory approach might be to present
the likelihood ratio of the evidence - the ratio of the probability that the actual test results
would have occurred if the two samples came from the same source to the probability that
the results would have arisen if someone else from a given population were the source of the
sample of unknown origin. But such an approach presents practical difficulties, not the least
of which is that it may be baffling to a jury. We are inclined to believe that the binary
approach, either declaring a match or not according to previously prescribed criteria, is a
satisfactory method of summarizing the data, even though some information is lost in this
way. In any event, this is the way the data is usually presented, and we will not challenge it
here.
21. See, e.g., NRC II, supra note 10, at 97-108 (arguing that this assumption of indepen-
dence may not be precisely accurate, but that if the markers are chosen carefully, it is accu-
rate enough for use in forensic casework).
22. See, e.g., Lempert, After the DNA Wars, supra note 11; Lempert, Some Caveats, supra
note 11; Kathryn Roeder, DNA Fingerprinting: A Review of the Controversy, 9 STAT. SC.
222 (1994). See generally NRC I, supra note 8, passim; NRC II, supra note 10, passim.
[Vol. 97:931
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for the most part this process is by now rather well-accepted. Our
concern is with the process by which the matching samples came to
be tested, and the implications that this has for the value of the
evidence and the manner in which it should be presented.
DNA can be used to test for identity in various contexts in liti-
gation, but we will focus on the most important setting. A crime
has been committed, and a person, assertedly the perpetrator, has
left a sample of fluid or tissue containing testable DNA at the scene
of the crime or at some other scene associated with the crime. This
sample is often known as the "crime sample." The police know that
if they find a person whose DNA matches that of the crime sample
they may have found the perpetrator. Now we will consider two
scenarios by which the police might find a match. In each scenario,
we will call the person whose profile matches the crime sample
"Matcher."
B. The Confirmation Case
In the first scenario, what we will call the confirmation case,
there is a substantial amount of evidence pointing to Matcher
before his DNA is even tested. This evidence might include testi-
mony by a victim of the crime or some other eyewitness identifying
Matcher as the perpetrator. It might also include a trail of blood or
other circumstantial evidence leading, literally or figuratively, from
the crime to Matcher. In any event, the police, believing that they
may have their man, secure a DNA test of Matcher. Sure enough,
the "suspect sample," as it is often known, matches the crime
sample.
Just how this evidence should be presented is a difficult ques-
tion.23 One method that is widely used, and that at least for present
purposes we regard as satisfactory, states the match probability.
This is the probability that, if nothing were known about a person
other than that he was a member of some defined population, his
DNA profile would match that of the crime sample.2 4 This
probability quantifies the rareness of an "innocent" or "chance"
match. A forensic scientist testifying in this manner might say
something like:
23. See, e.g., Regina v. Doheny, [1997] 1 Crim. App. 369, 375 (Eng. C.A. 1996); EvETr &
WEIR, supra note 13, at 222-38; Richard D. Friedman, Assessing Evidence, 94 McH. L. REv.
1810, 1835-37 (1996); Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of
DNA Evidence at Tria4 34 Jusnvriurcs J. 21 (1993).
24. As is most common, we use the term match probability to refer to the probability of a
match as assessed after the profile of the crime sample is known.
February 1999]
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The crime sample matches the sample taken from Matcher. The
probability that a sample taken from an arbitrarily chosen member of
Defined Population would match the crime sample is 1 in R.
Note that "1 in R" is another way of saying p, where p is the match
probability325
An alternative approach is for the forensic scientist to testify in
terms of the likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio of a piece of evi-
dence with respect to two hypotheses is the ratio of the probability
that the evidence would arise given the first hypothesis to the
probability that the evidence would arise given the second hypothe-
sis. In any given situation, the greater the likelihood ratio, the more
strongly the piece of evidence is probative of the first hypothesis as
compared to the second. The relationship is described by Bayes's
Theorem: The prior odds times the likelihood ratio equal the pos-
terior odds. The prior odds equal the ratio of the probability of
hypothesis 1 to the probability of hypothesis 2, assessed in the ab-
sence of the piece of evidence in question; the posterior odds are
the same ratio, but calculated with that item of evidence taken into
account. A forensic scientist testifying in terms of the likelihood
ratio might say something like:
These results are R times more likely to have arisen given the propo-
sition that Matcher was the source of the crime sample than given the
proposition that an arbitrarily chosen member of Defined Population
was the source of that sample.
The likelihood ratio approach may be more satisfying intellectu-
ally than the match probability approach, but in the typical confir-
mation case it is probably less satisfactory practically, in part
because it seems to tend to confuse jurors.26
C. The Trawl Case
In the second scenario - what we are calling the "trawl case"
- apart from the crime sample the police do not at first have evi-
dence that narrows their search to one suspect, or even to a few.
This might, for instance, be a rape case in which the rapist was a
stranger to the victim and was not apprehended immediately after
the crime. But the police do have the crime sample. And they also
have a database containing profiles of DNA samples taken from a
25. Because p is a number between zero and one, presumably so small that it has several
zeroes immediately to the right of the decimal point, it is often easier to deal with R, a
number greater than one.
26. See Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Fre-
quencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 859, 877-80 (1996). See
generally Doheny, 1 Crim. App. 369 (Eng. C.A. 1996).
[Vol. 97:931
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large number of people, one of whom might be the perpetrator.
Sure enough, the database search yields one profile, and only one,
that matches the crime sample. The police then try to find further
evidence incriminating the source of that proffle, Matcher, and per-
haps they find it. Perhaps, for example, when Matcher is brought
before the victim, she identifies him as the perpetrator.
The trawl case will take on increasing importance in coming
years. Development has been fast in England and Wales, where
since 1995 DNA profiles have been taken routinely from, among
others, all persons charged with a "recordable offence." 27 In the
United States, development of a national database has been much
more complex. In part because of the encouragement, including
financial incentives, offered by the DNA Identification Act of
1994,28 all fifty states now require designated sets of convicted of-
fenders to provide DNA samples for analysis.2 9 The state databases
operate in accordance with national quality assurance standards
27. The statutory authority is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 63(3)(b)
(Eng.). If the person is subsequently found innocent, in most circumstances the proffile is
removed from the database. The English database now contains approximately 350,000 sam-
ples and is growing at a rate of 200,000 samples per year. Personal communication with Dr.
Peter Gill, Forensic Science Service (August 1998).
28. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 210301-210306, 108 Stat.
2065 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796kk to 3796kk-6, 14131-14134 (1994) and codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3751, 3753, 3793, 3797 (1994)); see also Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries
and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REv. 49, 86 &
nn. 173-74 (1995).
29. All but one of the citations are provided in Statutes and Legislation Regarding
Mandatory Submission of Blood Samples for DNA Identification Purposes, in FoamNsic
DNA STATUT-S 50 (assembled by Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1998); see also Krent,
supra note 28.
Most of the state laws require samples only from persons convicted of a narrow set of
felonies, including homicide and sexual assault. Four states (Alabama, New Mexico, Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming) require samples from all convicted felons. See Wade, supra note 6.
Louisiana requires samples from, among others, persons arrested for felony sex offenses or
other specified offenses after September 1, 1999. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A)
(West Supp. 1999) (effective September 1, 1999); Wade, supra note 6.
So far, the constitutionality of the state laws has largely been upheld. See, e.g., Schlicher
v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding a Kansas law requiring persons convicted
of designated felonies to submit blood and saliva samples for compilation of a database of
genetic markers); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding a-Colorado
statute requiring an inmate convicted of an offense involving sexual assault to provide the
state with a DNA sample before release on parole); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding a state law that requires persons convicted of murder, a sexual offense, or
conspiracy or attempt to commit a sexual offense to submit a blood sample for preparation of
a DNA database), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.
1992) (upholding a Virginia statute requiring convicted felons to submit blood samples for
creation of a DNA database, but holding part of the enforcement mechanism invalid as an ex
post facto law). But see Landry v. Harshbarger, No. CIV.A.98-462 (Mass. Super. Ct., Aug.
12, 1998) (unpublished order preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a Massachusetts statute
requiring any person convicted of any of an array of enumerated offenses to submit a DNA
sample).
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and software designed by the FBI and participate in the Combined
DNA Information System (CODIS) maintained by the FBI. Since
October 1998, the FBI has been able to compare the proffle of a
DNA sample from a crime scene with all the proffles in the system.
Thus, CODIS now operates in effect as a national database.30 As of
October 1998, laboratories reported analyzing more than 250,000
profiles for entry in CODIS, with several hundred thousand more
waiting to be analyzed.31 As of the same time, CODIS had been
responsible for over 400 "hits."' 32 This number will almost certainly
increase dramatically within the next few years.33
Over time, one can imagine databases even broader than the
current ones; fingerprints are now routinely taken from arrestees as
well as convicts, and from many persons not suspected of crime,
and it is plausible to suppose that the same will occur with respect
to DNA samples.3 4 Indeed, the manager of the English database -
which operates under fewer administrative and constitutional con-
straints than its counterpart in the United States - has said he ex-
pects that evexitually it will include a third of all English men
between the ages of sixteen and thirty.35
And now we can perceive what we have called the database
search problem. In the confirmation case, the fact that Matcher's
sample, the only one tested, matched the crime sample is clearly
powerful evidence that Matcher was the source of the crime sam-
ple. But in the trawl case, many samples were tested, without a
finger already pointing to any particular suspect. How does this
factor affect the strength of the evidence of a DNA match? How, if
at all, should that evidence be presented in court? We turn to that
problem in Part II.
30. See Wade, supra note 6.
31. Personal communication with M. Dawn Herkenham, Chief, Forensic Science Systems
Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Aug. 12 & Nov. 3, 1998).
32. Id. on Nov. 2, 1998. See also the web page of the FBI's Forensic Science Research
and Training Center (visited Dec. 4, 1998) <http:lwww.fbi.govlab/reportlresearch.htm>.
33. Note the comment made by NRC II in 1996:
As the number and size of DNA databanks increase, the identification of suspects by
this means will become more common. Already, more than 20 suspects have been iden-
tified by searches through databases maintained by various states. The number and sizes
of these databases are sure to increase.
NRC II, supra note 10, at 134.
34. See Wade, supra note 6, at Al (quoting M. Dawn Herkenham, chief of the FBI's
Forensic Science Systems Unit: "I think the trend is that 10 years from now all felonies will
be covered .... We recommend that all violent felonies, burglaries, juveniles and retroactiv-
ity for people on parole be included.").
Whether such broad databases are appropriate raises issues of policy and constitutional
law on which we do not mean to express an opinion.
35. See Wade, supra note 6.
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II. ANALYZING THE DATABASE SEARCH'PROBLEM
In Section A of this Part, we summarize the analyses of the
database search problem in NRC I and NRC II. Section B offers
our basic analysis. Section C then re-examines the NRC analyses,
focusing on NRC II and demonstrating what we believe to be its
flaws. Section D discusses how evidence of a DNA match after a
database trawl fits into the case as a whole. Section E addresses the
issue of how such evidence should be presented to the jury. And
Section F criticizes the recommendation for re-testing made by
NRC I and recently endorsed by some scholars.
A. The NRC Analyses
1. NRCI
In NRC I, a Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Sci-
ence specially appointed by the NRC said:
The distinction between finding a match between an evidence
sample and a suspect sample and finding a match between an evi-
dence sample and one of many entries in a DNA profile database is
important. The chance of finding a match in the second case is con-
siderably higher, because one does not start with a single hypothesis
to test (i.e., that the evidence was left by a particular suspect), but
instead fishes through the databank, trying out many hypotheses. 36
Thus, the Committee pointed out, "[i]f a pattern has a frequency
of 1 in 10,000, there would still be a considerable probability (about
10%) of seeing it by chance in a databank of 1,000 people. ' 37 The
report recommended a cautious solution: A match between an "ev-
idence sample" - what we are calling the crime sample - and a
profile in a database "should be used only as the basis for further
testing using markers at additional loci.' '38 Thatis, evidence of the
initial match should be deemed "probable cause" for securing a
blood sample from the person so identified, and comparing it with
the evidence sample using markers that were not used in the initial
test. What is more, if the second test indicates that the two samples
matched, "only the statistical frequency associated with the addi-
tional loci should be presented at trial (to prevent the selection bias
that is inherent in searching a databank). '39
36. NRC I, supra note 8, at 124.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 129.
39. Id. at 124.
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To understand this approach, which has recently been endorsed
by eminent scholars,40 consider a simple example. Suppose that a
trawl through a database containing 100,000 (or 10') proffles re-
vealed that Matcher's profile, and no others in the database,
matched the crime sample, and that the probability that the profile
of an arbitrarily chosen member of Defined Population would
match the crime sample is 1 in 10,000,000 (or 1 in 10'). This in itself
would not be admissible evidence under the approach recom-
mended by NRC I. But it would justify taking another sample from
Matcher and using additional markers to compare it to the crime
sample. Suppose further that on this second test Matcher's proffle
matches that of the crime sample, that the match probability on this
second test is 1 in 1,000,000 (or 1 in 106), and that the markers used
in this second test are independent not only of each other but of
those used in the first test. Then, according to NRC I, the prosecu-
tion should be allowed to present evidence that Matcher's DNA
matches that of the crime sample. But the prosecution's forensic
science witness should not be able to testify that the probability of a
match of the crime sample and the DNA of an arbitrarily chosen
member of the population is 1 in 10 trillion (or 1 in 10"') - which is
the probability, assuming the results of the two tests to be in-
dependent, that an arbitrarily chosen member of Defined Popula-
tion would match the crime sample on all the markers used in both
tests. Instead, the witness would only be allowed to use the figures
for the second test, reporting that the probability of a match is 1 in
106.
2. NRC II
NRC II offered an analysis of the database search problem that
was quite similar to that of NRC I, but recommended a substan-
tially more lenient solution. According to NRC II, an "important
difference," a difference of a "logical" nature, between the confir-
mation case and the trawl case is illustrated by this simple set of
statistical facts:
[I]f we toss 20 reputedly unbiased coins once each, there is roughly
one chance in a million that all 20 will show heads. According to
standard statistical logic, the occurrence of this highly unlikely event
would be regarded as evidence discrediting the hypothesis that the
coins are unbiased. But if we repeat this experiment of 20 tosses a
large enough number of times, there will be a high probability that all
40. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (views of Professors Morton and
Lempert).
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20 coins will show heads in at least one experiment. In that case, an
event of 20 heads would not be unusual and would not in itself be
judged as evidence that the coins are biased.41
Further, contended the report, "[t]he initial identification of a sus-
pect through a search of a DNA database is analogous to perform-
ing the coin-toss experiment many times: A match by chance alone
is more likely the larger the number of profiles examined." 42
Thus, NRC II indicated that it is necessary "[t]o decide if the
database search itself has contributed to obtaining a match," in the
same way that the repetition of the twenty-coin experiment might
have been "responsible for producing the 20 heads." 43 The report
therefore argued that the appropriate quantity to consider is the
probability, under the hypothesis that the crime sample "was not
left by someone whose DNA profile is in the database (or a close
relative of such a person)," that at least one of the database profiles
would match the crime sample.44 Assume, as is usually the case,
that p, the probability that any given profile will match that of the
crime sample, is very small. Then, making some other simplifying
assumptions, the probability that at least one profile from a
database of D + 1 profiles will match the crime sample is very close
to, and no greater than, (D + l)p.45 That is, each profile compared
increases the probability that there will be a match by a tiny
amount, very close to p. D + 1 comparisons therefore yield a
probability of just about - but not exactly! - (D + l)p.4 6
Accordingly, NRC II recommended that "[w]hen the suspect is
found by a search of DNA databases, the random-match
probability should be multiplied by ... the number of persons in the
database." 47 Thus, instead of using R, which equals lip, the forensic
scientist would use
RI(D + 1). (1)
If testifying in terms of the match probability, she would say,
The probability that a sample taken from an arbitrarily chosen mem-
ber of Defined Population would match the crime sample is 1 in RI(D
+ 1).
41. NRC II, supra note 10, at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 135.
46. The exact formula for the probability of at least one match is 1-(l-p)(Dl). If D + 1 is
much smaller than lip, which we have called R, then this quantity is very close to (D + 1)p.
47. Recommendation 5.1, NRC II, supra note 10, at 40.
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We will refer to this argument, to which NRC II gives primacy, as
its frequentist argument.
NRC II also presents another, distinct, argument, which we will
call its likelihood ratio argument. "If one wishes to describe the im-
pact of the DNA evidence under the hypothesis that the source of
the evidence sample is someone in the database," recommends
NRC II, "then the likelihood ratio should be divided by [the
number of profiles in the database.]" 48 That is, according to this
argument, the likelihood ratio of evidence of a single match found
after searching a database of D + 1 profiles is not R but rather R/(D
+ 1),49 which we have already seen as Expression (1).
The two arguments in NRC II are different. The frequentist ar-
gument assesses the probability that at least one profile in the
database would match the crime sample by chance, while the likeli-
hood ratio argument attempts, by different means, to assess the
value of the evidence that exactly one of those profiles matches the
crime scene. These approaches lead to different answers.50 The
factor of (D + 1) - by which, according to the report, the probative
force of the evidence should be reduced to account for the fact that
the match resulted from a database trawl - is a conservative ap-
proximation under the frequentist approach, but an exact number
under the likelihood ratio approach. Both approaches, though,
share the perception that the more profiles examined, the less pro-
bative the evidence.
B. Our Analysis
Though the NRC reports differ in their ultimate recommenda-
tions, their analyses of the database search problem are very simi-
lar. We believe that these analyses, and those of scholars who have
supported the NRC approach, are clearly wrong. They ask the
wrong question, and they fail to recognize the full import of evi-
dence of identification based on a database search.
The proper view of the situation, which we will present here,
reflects a rather simple intuition. The value of a DNA match is
attributable to the rarity of the proffle. If the DNA of a particular
person matches the crime sample, that evidence strongly supports
48. NRC II, supra note 10, at 40. The argument is developed in detail in Stockmarr,
supra note 11, at 6-9.
49. We show how to derive this ratio in the Appendix. See also Stockmarr, supra note 11,
at 8.
50. These differences are small when the databases are small, and they disappear alto-
gether in the limiting case in which there is only one profile in the database.
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the proposition that that person was the source of the crime sample;
that is, the evidence makes that proposition appear far more prob-
able than it did before the match was known. That other samples
have been tested and found not to match does not weaken the pro-
bative value of the match, with respect to this particular proposition,
which is the one of interest at the time of trial. On the contrary,
this result somewhat strengthens the probative value of the match,
because it eliminates some other persons as potential sources. How
probable it appears that the particular person is the source depends
not only on the DNA evidence but also on the othei evidence in the
case. If there is no other evidence pointing to him, then the propo-
sition will not appear as likely as if there were such evidence - not
because the DNA evidence is any less valuable, but because the
prior probability of the proposition is so low. And evidence found
after the DNA match is determined might be subject to a ground of
skepticism - the possibility of suggestiveness created by the match
itself - not applicable to evidence found beforehand. Thus, the
probability that the defendant is the source of the crime sample
may well appear less in the trawl case than in the confirmation case,
but this is not because the DNA evidence itself is any weaker in the
trawl case.
We will now explore the reasoning that leads to these
conclusions.
Both NRC I and NRC II emphasized that, as the number of
profiles tested increases, so too does the probability of finding a
match with the crime sample. That is indisputably true. One can
even say that the larger a database is the more likely it is that the
database will yield at least one false positive result - a profile that
matches the crime scene sample but that does not come from the
source of that sample.51 But the conclusion that the NRC reports
draw is that the larger a database is (up to a point) the less valuable
51. This appears rather obvious: The more profiles there are in the database, the more
probable it is that at least one of them will match that of the crime sample but be from
someone other than the source of that sample. That is, the number of false positives will tend
to increase with the size of the database.
It is even true that the larger the database is, up to a point, the more probable it is that
there will be exactly one false positive. (Our analysis has focused, for simplicity, on the most
important case, in which the database search turns up exactly one match with the crime sam-
ple.) One attempting to support the NRC analyses might well point out that, the larger the
database is, up to a point, the more probable it is that there will be exactly one false positive.
That is, the more probable it is that both the following propositions are true: (1) A search of
the database will turn up exactly one sample that matches the crime sample, and (2) in fact
the source of the crime sample is someone who has not contributed a sample to the database.
After a point, this conjunction of possibilities becomes less likely because the second part of
it - that the source was someone outside the database - becomes very unlikely, and the
first part may also become less likely.
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is evidence that a database trawl yielded a single match. Here the
NRC and its supporters go wrong.
The proposition that the DNA evidence is offered to prove is
not the broad one that the source of the crime sample is a person
represented in the database. Rather, it is that one particular person
- the defendant in the case at hand - is the source of that sample.
And the evidence bearing on this proposition is not simply that
there was one match within the database. Rather, it is that the
DNA of that particular person - alone of all those tested - matches
the crime sample. We will examine in turn each of these assertions.
1. Identifying the Material Proposition
First, consider the material proposition - or, in the words of
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, the "fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action" - that the DNA evidence is of-
fered to prove.5 2 It is the guilt of the defendant, whom we have
called Matcher, that the prosecution wants to prove; that is what
the case is about, and all the prosecution's evidence is offered to
raise the probability of the proposition that the defendant is guilty.
The DNA evidence cannot answer whether the defendant commit-
ted the crime alleged. But if Matcher was the source of the crime
sample, then Matcher's guilt presumably appears much more likely.
It is the probability that Matcher is the source of the crime sample
that is of importance to the prosecution - not the larger
probability that somebody represented in the database is the
source.
Adherents to the NRC approach believe there is a flaw in this
reasoning. The material proposition on which DNA evidence
bears, in our view, is that Matcher is the source of the crime sample.
How can we identify that as the material proposition if there was no
evidence pointing to Matcher - he was not a suspect - before the
database search singled him out for attention?53 We will return to
this question in Part III, where we will analyze the statistical way of
thinking that appears to make it troublesome. For now, we will of-
fer an answer that satisfies us.
Even if at any stage of the investigation or trial there is not yet
any evidence pointing to Matcher, he, like everybody else in the
world who had not been eliminated as a possibility, is in fact a sus-
52. See FED. R. Evm. 401 (defining "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence").
53. See, e.g., Stockmarr, supra note 11, at 6-8.
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pect in the limited sense that he is possibly the source of the crime
sample. Thus, an investigator or factfinder asked to do so might
assign a probability to the proposition that Matcher is the source.
The absence of other evidence pointing to him would presumably
yield prior odds in favor of the proposition - that is, the odds as
assessed without benefit of the evidence of interest, here the DNA
evidence - that were extremely low. But those odds would be
above zero, and so subject to being raised by evidence pointing in
Matcher's direction. All other things being equal, the lower the
prior odds favoring the proposition that Matcher is the source, the
lower the posterior odds - the odds assessed with the DNA evi-
dence taken into account - in favor of the proposition; recall that,
according to Bayes's Theorem, the posterior odds of a proposition
equal the prior odds of the proposition times the likelihood ratio.
In other words, the fact that Matcher is not a particular object of
suspicion before the DNA evidence is fully taken into account by
the extremely low prior odds.
2. The Impact of the Evidence
Having identified the proposition of interest - that Matcher is
the source of the crime sample - let us now examine the impact of
the evidence at issue. This is proof that Matcher's DNA profile
matches that of the crime sample and that the profiles of none of
the other people represented in a database match that sample.
The most important aspect of this evidence is that Matcher's
DNA profle matches that of the crime sample. The significance of
this fact, with respect to the question of whether Matcher was the
source of the crime sample, is unaltered by the fact that other sam-
ples have been tested. Assuming hypothetically that Matcher is the
source, the probability of this match is, for all practical purposes, 1.
Assuming hypothetically that Matcher is not the source, the
probability of this match may be assessed as p, where p is the
probability that the DNA of a person arbitrarily selected from the
suspect population would match the crime sample;54 note that 11p
54. The suspect population is the population from which the crime sample is believed to
originate. The notion of a suspect population is a useful simplification for some analyses, but
its limitations are important to recognize. It seems to suggest that all people within a defined
group are equally likely, before any other evidence is received, to have committed the crime,
and that anyone outside that group could not have committed it. But clearly this is not so. In
the typical stranger rape case, for example, a man who lives within five miles of the crime
scene is more likely, absent other evidence, to have committed the crime than a man who
lives 300 miles away, and that man is a more likely suspect than one who lives on the other
side of the world - but even the man from the antipodes cannot be altogether excluded. For
further comments, see EvErr & WEIR, supra note 13, at 27-28, 233-34.
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equals R, the number used in both the match probability and the
likelihood ratio forms of testimony.55 Neither of these probabilities
is altered by the fact that other samples have been tested, or by the
degree to which an investigator believed before testing began that
Matcher was a likely suspect.
Now consider in addition the fact that other samples have in fact
been tested and found not to match the crime sample. With respect
to the precise proposition at issue - that Matcher is the source of
the crime sample - this fact can only enhance the probative value
of the DNA evidence. One reason for this is that the additional
information that a significant number of persons have been tested
and found not to match the crime sample can only make the profile
of that sample appear rarer than it did absent that information.
This factor will almost always be of negligible importance, and we
will put it aside for further analysis. 56 Potentially more importantly,
a number of people other than the defendant who previously ap-
peared to be possible sources of the crime sample have now been
eliminated, thus making each of the remaining possibilities some-
what more probable. Assuming, as is usually the case, that the size
of the database is very small in comparison to the suspect popula-
tion, this effect too will be negligible, but as the size of the database
increases in comparison to that population, the effect becomes
dominant. If the database includes the entire suspect population,
then the existence of only one match points the finger without
doubt (assuming accurate testing)57 at the person so identified.
55. See supra section I.B.
56. This effect is demonstrated in Balding & Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence,
supra note 13, at 604; EvErr & WaR, supra note 13, at 220.
57. Some perceptive scholars have emphasized the importance of the possibility of labo-
ratory error, which is often far more plausible than the possibility of a match by chance. See,
e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even
When a National Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 JvuMETRICs J. 425
(1997); Lempert, After the DNA Wars, supra note 11, at 446-54; William C. Thompson & S.
Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints, in
FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 93 (Mark A. Farley & James J. Harrington eds., 1991). We
agree that jurors should take the possibility of lab error into account in their subjective as-
sessment of the evidence. It is important to emphasize, however, that what matters is not the
probability of any laboratory error, but rather only the probability of those errors that would
lead to the false declaration of a match in the given case - a probability that will vary widely
with the circumstances of the DNA testing. For a fuller treatment, see David J. Balding &
Peter Donnelly, Inferring Identity from DNA Profile Evidence, PROC. NATL. ACAD. Sci.
(USA) 11,741 (1995). See also infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (analyzing "paradox
of the lottery" in similar terms); A. Philip Dawid & Julia Mortera, Forensic Identification with
Imperfect Evidence, 85 BIoMErl-rA 835, 844 (1998) (drawing analogy to lottery paradox but
inaccurately ascribing erroneous argument to Balding and Donnelly). In particular, the
probability of this type of error will tend to be smaller in a trawl case than in many confirma-
tion cases because in the trawl case the DNA profiling of the crime sample and the defend-
ant's sample are performed at different times and often in different laboratories.
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As shown in the Appendix, the basic nature of this relation may
be expressed rather simply in symbols. Subject to some simplifying
assumptions, the likelihood ratio of the DNA evidence equals
R x [1 + mDIN], (2)
where D is the number of people in the database, apart from the
one member - here Matcher - whose DNA matches that of the
crime sample; N represents the number of people in the suspect
population but not in the database; and m is an optional multiplier
meant to reflect how many times more likely-a given person repre-
sented in the database (other than Matcher) was believed, before
the search results were known, to be the source of the crime sample
than was a given person in the suspect population but not in the
database. This multiplier is optional in the sense that, if it is consid-
ered inappropriate to assume that persons represented in the
database are more likely than others to be the source of the crime
sample, the multiplier can simply be assumed to be 1. Note several
points about Expression (2).
(a) Because neither m, D, nor N can be negative, this expression
cannot be less than R, the likelihood ratio of a match in the confir-
mation case. Because p, the match probability, is less (presumably
much less) than 1, the likelihood ratio R, which equals (lip), is
greater than 1, meaning that the evidence tends to support the
proposition at issue. And if m, D, and N are all positive, then Ex-
pression (2) indicates that the likelihood ratio of the DNA evidence
yielded by the database search is at least slightly greater than that
for comparable evidence yielded by a match in the confirmation
case.
(b) If D is zero - that is, no DNA is tested but that of the
person who yields a match - Expression (2) yields a likelihood
ratio of R, just what we would expect for the confirmation case.
Indeed, though for convenience we have been treating the con-
firmation case and the trawl case as antithetical, we should recog-
nize that they are really variations of a more generalized database
search case: In the confirmation case, the database consists of only
one profile, instead of many, and typically the investigator has a
relatively high prior probability that the person who is the source of
that profile is also the source of the crime sample. Moreover, many
In addition to providing information that will assist the jury in assessing the probability of
a false report of a match in the case at hand, an expert should provide information bearing on
the probability of an actual match on the assumption that the defendant is innocent. We
focus in this article on how the latter probability - which is also the focus of most expert
testimony in this area - is affected by the fact that the match is the result of a database
search.
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cases fall in the middle. The police may have several people under
suspicion and test them all. In such a case, the profiles of all of the
suspects may be considered a relatively small database, and the
prior probability for each suspect is smaller than in the confirma-
tion case but much greater than in the trawl case. The facts of each
variation are different - but the fundamental analysis is the same.
(c) If N is zero - that is, there is nobody in the suspect popula-
tion whose DNA is not tested - then Expression (2) yields an infi-
nitely large likelihood ratio. This again is what we would expect. It
means that the fact of Matcher's match and the absence of any
other match are together effectively absolute proof - putting aside
such considerations as laboratory error - that Matcher was the
source of the crime sample.
C. NRC 11 Revisited
In Section B, we have introduced the basics of our analysis.
With this background, we can examine more closely the logic, or as
we see it the illogic, of the NRC analysis. We will focus here on
NRC II, which not only is more recent but offers fuller arguments,
with two variations, the frequentist and likelihood ratio arguments.
We will discuss these arguments both separately - for they are dif-
ferent, the differences having caused some dissension in the NRC
camp58 - and together, for they share basic flaws.
1. The Frequentist Argument
First consider the frequentist argument. Our analysis shows the
immateriality of NRC II's hypothetical of an experiment in which
twenty coins are repeatedly tossed once each. As NRC II points
out, if this experiment is done enough times, an event of twenty
heads is not so unusual and does not strongly suggest that the coins
are biased. But this hypothetical does not represent the reality of
the situation involving DNA evidence. A more material hypotheti-
cal would be as follows: A coin known to be biased, but otherwise
indistinguishable from all those in a piggy bank, is thrown into the
bank. From the coins in the bank, a tester picks out a handful at
random, and flips each of them twenty times. Each lands heads up
approximately ten times - except for one coin, which shows heads
on all twenty flips. This experiment is powerful, albeit not conclu-
sive, evidence that the coin that landed heads up is the biased coin
58. Professor Morton's approach is founded on the frequentist argument. See Morton,
supra note 11, at 488. Dr. Stockmarr explicitly rejects that argument, giving the likelihood
ratio argument instead. See Stockmarr, supra note 11, at 9.
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that was thrown into the bank. Just how powerful the evidence is
will depend on how common biased coins are believed to be in the
bank. But one point seems utterly clear: The evidence that the one
twenty-heads-up coin is the biased one thrown into the bank is
made marginally stronger, not less strong, by the fact that other
coins were tried and appeared to be unbiased.
Another analogy might also highlight the failure of the NRC
analysis. For many years, skeptics of conventional probability the-
ory have posed the so-called "paradox of the lottery." There is
some chance that the person announcing the winning ticket in a
lottery will get the number wrong. If the number of tickets in the
lottery is huge, the prior probability - assessed before the an-
nouncement - of any given ticket being the winner is very small.
So if the number of tickets is large enough, does this mean that we
should not have much confidence in the announcement of the win-
ning ticket?59 No, it does not. The proposition at issue is that a
given ticket T is the winner, and the evidence presented is that T
was announced as the winner. If T is not in fact the winner, it is not
enough to account for that evidence merely that the announcer
made a mistake. Rather, the announcer would have had to make
that particular mistake - announcing T among all other possibili-
ties - to produce this evidence. That is extremely unlikely, and the
more lottery tickets there are the more unlikely it is. Hence, the
announcer's declaration that T is the winner carries great weight, as
one would expect.60 Similarly, the NRC analysis of the database
search problem fails to take into account that the proposition at
issue at trial is that a particular person was the source of the crime
sample, and that the evidence presented is that that particular per-
son's DNA matches the crime sample.
2. The Likelihood Ratio Argument
Now consider the NRC II likelihood ratio argument. Recall
that this argument considers the likelihood ratio of the evidence
59. Two early presentations of the problem are RIcHRD PRICE, FOUR DISSERTATIONS
410-12 (1767), and ISAAC TODHUNTER, A HISTORY OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF
PROBABILITY FROM THE TnM OF PASCAL TO THAT OF LAPLACE 400 (1865). Todhunter's
presentation is quoted in Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Quantitative Methods and
Legal Decisions, 46 U. Cmi. L. Rnv. 116, 148 n.114 (1978). See also L. Jonathan Cohen, Can
Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated? 4 BEHAv. & BRAIN SCI. 317, 329
(1981).
60. For fuller analyses see Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hear-
say, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 683-85, 736-39 (1987); Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical
Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and
Methods, 75 CORNELL L. Rnv. 247, 270-71 (1990).
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that there is exactly one match in the database, for the hypotheses
that the source of the crime sample is, or is not, in the database.
This likelihood ratio is R/(D + 1). We have no quarrel with the
calculation of this ratio.61 In our view, NRC II has simply given the
right answer to the wrong question. Indeed, our analysis has sug-
gested that the question NRC II answers is wrong in two ways. Its
likelihood ratio does not pertain to the evidence at hand (that
Matcher's profile matches the crime sample), nor does it concern
the proposition at issue (that Matcher is the source of the crime
sample). Rather, it has treated the evidence as revealing only the
limited fact that within the database there was exactly one match of
the crime sample, and has determined the likelihood ratio of this
evidence for the generalized proposition that the source of the
crime sample is someone reflected in the database.62 With respect
to that generalized proposition, the evidence does indeed have
lower probative value the more profiles there are in the database.
But that proposition, as we have seen, is not what is at issue.
3. Anomalies
We can now see that the analyses of NRC II lead to various
anomalies.
a. The large database. Suppose that the database is large in
comparison to the suspect population. This could happen because
the suspect population is very small - if, for example, it appears
that the crime must have been committed within a closed group
such as the people of an isolated village or the crew of a ship at sea.
Or, in theory, it could happen if an enormously large database were
compiled - if, say, it became accepted practice throughout the
world to take a DNA sample from every person at birth. It is obvi-
ous that if everyone in the suspect population is represented in the
database, then proof that exactly one person's DNA matches the
crime sample is conclusive proof (again, putting aside the possibility
of lab error) that this person is the source. And this is in accord
with the analysis we have presented, which indicates a steady, con-
tinuous relation: As indicated by Expression (2), the greater the
percentage of the suspect population that is represented in the
database, the more probative is evidence that exactly one profile in
the database matches the crime sample.
61. We present a derivation of this likelihood ratio in Section D of the Appendix.
62. That proposition would also have higher prior odds the more profiles there are in the
database, and these two factors would tend to balance out. See infra section ILD.2.
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NRC II agrees - as it must, for the point is obvious - that for
a sufficiently large database this evidence provides overwhelming
proof that the one person identified by the match is the source of
the crime sample. 63 But how can this concession be reconciled with
the report's assertion that the strength of the evidence is weakened
by a factor equal to the number of persons in the database? The
report states that "[i]f the database searched includes a large pro-
portion of the population, the analysis must take that into ac-
count." 64 It gives no explicit advice as to how this can be done,
however - for the simple reason that it cannot be done without
undermining the underlying argument.65
b. The exculpatory match. If the NRC likelihood approach
were correct, in some circumstances the following bizarre outcome
could arise: A database would be searched, it would turn up one
match with the crime sample, and the person so identified could
claim that this evidence tends to exculpate him!
63. See NRC II, supra note 10, at 40 ("In the extreme case, a search of the whole popula-
tion should, of course, provide a definitive answer.")
64. Id.
65. Expression (1), which is the key quantity for both of the NRC's arguments, dimin-
ishes constantly as the size of the database increases, indicating diminishing value of the
evidence. There is no point at which it begins to move in the other direction - obviously so,
for the size of the database is the denominat6i of the Expression and is unrelated to the
numerator. NRC II offers no hints at what point, or under what circumstances, the argu-
ments leading to Expression (1) lose force and some other argument becomes dominant.
NRC II does suggest that the likelihood ratio argument leads to a proper assessment of
posterior odds, see NRC II, supra note 10, at 164-65, but as we indicate infra section Hl.D.2,
this is no consolation for the argument.
Stockmarr offers an extended discussion of the problem of the large database, see
Stockmarr, supra note 11, at 10-14, but his argument is irretrievably flawed. Stockmarr's
argument, like the NRC's, appears to be based on the fact that he is able to produce a calcu-
lation yielding appropriate posterior odds for the case in which the database trawl yields one
match with the crime sample; the argument therefore suffers the same flaws as does the
NRC's. Stockmarr calculates the posterior odds for the trawl case (which we show in the
Appendix to equal RIN, in our notation), and then divides them by the likelihood ratio for
the confirmation case (R in our notation) to yield a factor, equal to the reciprocal of the
population not represented in the database (that is, 11N in our notation), that he calls a
"sliding correction" to take the size of the database into account. But the "correction"
merely means that he is able to reach the correct posterior odds. It is unclear what signifi-
cance Stockmarr attaches to the factor, given that he still maintains that the same likelihood
ratio prevails for the evidence no matter how large the database. Stockmarr's interpretation
also produces bizarre results - not surprising, given that he is comparing the posterior odds
from the trawl case with the likelihood ratio from the confirmation case, which, to borrow a
phrase from the English legal scholar Peter Mirfield, seems to us to be like comparing apples
and Tuesdays. Thus, he contends that if the database contains profiles from all but one mem-
ber of the population the evidence of a match has just the same strength as it would in the
confirmation case, and that if the database is at all smaller the evidence is weaker than in that
case. See id. at 14. He seems not to recognize fully that a single match after the search of
such a nearly all-inclusive database would be virtually conclusive evidence against the source
of the single matching sample.
February 1999]
Michigan Law Review
How could that occur? Recall that under the NRC likelihood
approach, the likelihood ratio of the DNA evidence, given one
match with the crime sample, is R/(D + 1). But there is no reason
why this ratio must be greater than one. In fact, if D + 1 is greater
than R then the ratio is less than one. That could happen if the
database (represented by D + 1) is relatively large or if the DNA
profile is relatively common (reflected by a low value for R). Such
a profile could occur if the DNA is so degraded that only a few
markers yield test results and only a partial profile is obtainable. 66
The root of the problem is easy to find. It is that the NRC anal-
ysis focuses on the wrong question, whether the source of the crime
sample is represented in the database, not on the question of
whether the defendant is the source of the sample. R is the number
of profiles one would expect to have to search to get one match of a
given profile. Thus, if the database is larger than R, and yet only
one match turns up, that does indeed make it less probable that the
source is profiled in the database, because if the source were pro-
fied in the database we would expect to see at least two matches of
the crime sample in the database, one from the source and at least
one by chance.
The problem is eliminated, then, by focusing on the correct
proposition. Whatever the relation between R and D + 1, the evi-
dence makes it more probable - as our analysis indicates - that
the person identified by the trawl is the source.
c. The lucky strike. Now we will explore a pair of anomalies
that expose some ambiguity in the rationale of the NRC analysis.
Under that analysis, the value of DNA evidence is degraded when
(1) many DNA proffles are compared to that of the crime sample,
and (2) no individual was previously a strong suspect. But each of
these factors can exist without the other.
Suppose first that the police, with no particular reason to sus-
pect anybody, decide to compare the DNA profile of one person
chosen at random from the database - again, call him Matcher -
with that of the crime sample. And suppose that they get lucky:
The profiles happen to match. Plainly, this evidence is no stronger,
with respect to the proposition that that person was the source of
66. R would also be relatively low if the evidence were of some other kind of profile, such
as standard blood groupings, which are not as rare as DNA proffiles; the validity of the statis-
tical analysis does not depend on the identification technique used, and nothing in the deriva-
tion of the NRC's likelihood ratio (Expression (1)) depends on either the size of the database
or the value of the match probability.
Just as it is untenable to adjust the likelihood ratio prescribed by NRC II for large
databases, it is untenable to make another adjustment for relatively undiscriminating tests.
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the sample, than that which would be yielded if the entire database
were searched, and only that same person's profile matched that of
the crime sample. Indeed, this evidence is weaker, because unlike
the database search the one-to-one comparison does not eliminate
other suspects. And so our analysis indicates.
But what would the NRC approach say? If the key question
under that approach is whether multiple profiles have been com-
pared with the crime sample profile, then it would treat evidence of
this one-on-one comparison as stronger than the evidence in the
trawl case. Indeed, it would appear that the NRC should treat this
evidence as no weaker than that indicated by a match in the confir-
mation case. This appears anomalous.
Perhaps, then, the NRC's supporters would say that the DNA
evidence is in fact weaker than its one-on-one nature suggests, and
that the key factor is that before this evidence there was no particu-
lar reason to suspect Matcher. But, as we argue in the next subsec-
tion, the suggestion that the correct interpretation of the DNA test
depends on the degree of suspicion of Matcher prior to that test is
not only logically untenable but also unworkable. Moreover,
neither NRC approach provides any method of downgrading the
evidence in any case where only one sample was compared with the
crime sample.
d. The precautionary search. The "lucky strike" case featured
neither a prime suspect before DNA testing nor a database search.
Now turn the case around so that it includes both. Suppose -
more realistically - that the police suspect that Matcher is the
source of the crime sample, but that they compare the profile of
that sample not only with Matcher's but also with a database of D
other profiles, and that only Matcher's matches the profile of the
crime sample.
It seems blatantly obvious that this evidence is stronger, not
weaker, than the evidence typically yielded in the confirmation
case, in which the authorities would have proof of the match be-
tween Matcher and the crime sample and nothing more: The
search through the database gives the same information as in the
single-comparison case, and then some, by eliminating a group of
suspects. Once again, the approach we have presented is in accord
with the intuition that the more profiles that are compared and fail
to match the crime sample, the more probative is the evidence of
the one sample that does match.
What would the NRC treatment be? On the face of the NRC
analyses, it appears that they would point in the wrong direction,
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treating the evidence as weaker the more profiles that are searched
and found not to match. If this is true, then a suspect whose DNA
is about to be tested has an unambiguous incentive to demand that
the crime sample be measured against all available databases. 67 As-
suming the suspect's profile matches that of the crime sample, the
probative value of that evidence would obviously be diminished if
the database search turned up another match with that sample. But
under the NRC logic, that value would also be diminished even if
the database search turned out negative!68
Once again, a defender of the NRC approach might contend
that the key is not how many samples were tested but whether
Matcher was a suspect before the DNA tests were done. Here he
was such a suspect, the argument would go, and therefore the for-
mulas indicating degradation of probative value when a match is
found with a person who was not previously a suspect do not apply.
This argument fares no better. For one thing, it appears to give
up most of the case. As we have indicated above, even in the trawl
case Matcher was a suspect before the DNA tests were conducted,
in the sense that an investigator presumably would have assigned a
positive probability to the proposition that Matcher was the source.
If the response is that the treatment depends on the degree of prior
suspicion of Matcher - above a given threshold, the evidence to be
treated as if this were the confirmation case, and below as if it were
the trawl case - that also creates serious difficulties.69 There
seems to be no reasoned basis on which to choose such a threshold,
nor any reason why slight differences across such a threshold should
have such enormous consequences 7° in the treatment of the evi-
dence. And attempting to determine whether the threshold had
been crossed would presumably require a jury assessment of the
subjective state of the (possibly collective) mind of the investigator
at the time the DNA tests were ordered.
e. The sequential search. Now suppose that the police follow
this strategy: They investigate the crime, without using DNA evi-
dence, until they identify a specific suspect as the most likely perpe-
67. See Balding & Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence, supra note 13, at 605.
68. Indeed, if the database is large enough, the defendant might - under this theory -
even be able to make the match appear exculpatory. See supra section II.C.3.b.
69. Note that the prior probability that Matcher is the source is less in some confirmation
cases than in some trawl cases. The degree of suspicion of Matcher might be very slight in a
confirmation case, and in a trawl case it may be that everyone outside a very small database
has been eliminated as a suspect.
70. That is, a factor equal to the size of the database in assessing the match probability or
the likelihood ratio.
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trator. They then compare his DNA profile to that of the crime
sample. If the profiles match, he is charged, and no other suspects
are considered. If the profiles do not match, the police repeat the
process with the person who now appears to be the most likely sus-
pect. The process continues until a suspect matches the crime sam-
ple or, for some reason such as limited resources, the investigation
is halted.
Though this model may capture the important features of many
police investigations,71 there is no guidance in either NRC report
on how to handle it. The logic of the NRC frequentist argument
suggests that the quantity of interest to the court is the probability
that this search process would result in a match even though all the
suspects tested were innocent.72 Assessing this probability - which
depends on an assessment of the chance, across a wide array of
counterfactual circumstances, that the investigation would have
been called off before a match was achieved - is extremely diffi-
cult and highly subjective. Perhaps more seriously, this analysis
leads to an anomaly. Suppose that the crime is sufficiently serious
that the police would in all probability continue the search until a
match was found. Then under the NRC frequentist approach (and,
though it is hard for us to be sure of the NRC position, probably
under its likelihood ratio approach as well), the evidence of the
match would be nearly worthless.
This cannot be. One person tested, Matcher, has matched the
crime scene sample. This evidence is not by any means conclusive,
for there may well be other people with the same profile. But,
given that the profile is relatively rare it is nonetheless powerful
evidence against him, making the proposition that he is the source
far more probable than it was before. And this power can only be
increased by the fact that others, who apart from the DNA evi-
dence appeared to be more likely suspects, have been eliminated.73
f. Summary. These anomalies all highlight the fact that, be-
cause they fail to ask the right question, NRC II and its supporters
fail to recognize the full force of proof that a single profile in a
71. Particularly if it is extended to include the possibility that the police simultaneously
send samples from several suspects for profiling. This change does not alter our argument.
72. The frequentist argument in the trawl case is that the probability of interest is that of
the event that the database search procedure will yield a match if indeed all of the individuals
in the database are innocent. In the sequential search case, the analogy would be the
probability that the sequential search procedure would yield a match if indeed all of the
individuals sequentially investigated are innocent. This is effectively the classical statistical
approach to sequential hypothesis testing.
73. See Balding & Donnelly, Inference in Forensic Identification, supra note 13, at 27-29.
February 1999]
Michigan Law Review
DNA database matches the crime sample. Proof of a match be-
tween the crime sample and the profile of a given person is not
weaker evidence, with respect to the proposition that that person was
the source of the crime sample, because the person was identified as
a suspect by the database search itself. And the fact that the search
has eliminated some other persons as sources enhances the value of
the evidence, albeit very slightly in the usual case.
D. The Evidence as a Whole
1. Comparing the Confirmation and Trawl Cases
Thus far, we have analyzed only the strength of the DNA evi-
dence itself. But now consider the entire body of evidence in two
cases, a confirmation case and a trawl case, in which the DNA pro-
file of the crime sample is the same. For at least two reasons, the
weight of the entire body of evidence may well be stronger in the
confirmation case than in the trawl case.
First, by definition, in the confirmation case there is enough evi-
dence independent of the DNA evidence to cast strong suspicion on
the eventual defendant. By definition, that is not true before the
database search in the trawl case, and it may not be true even after.
And it may well be that, even after the trawl identifies the defend-
ant as having DNA matching that of the crime sample, there is little
or no other evidence tending to suggest that he is the perpetrator of
the crime.74 Assuming that this is true, and that the database
searched in the trawl case was not very large in proportion to the
suspect population, the entire body of evidence will plainly be
stronger in the confirmation case than in the trawl case (though it
may still be strong enough in the trawl case to warrant conviction).
The prior odds of guilt are many times greater in the typical confir-
mation case than in the typical trawl case; if the likelihood ratio of
the DNA evidence is approximately the same in the two cases, then
the posterior odds - assessed after all the evidence is in - will also
be much greater in the confirmation case than in the trawl case.75
74. Regina v. Adams, [1998] 1 Crim. App. 377 (Eng. C.A. 1997), a rape case, is the text-
book example. Effectively the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime was a DNA
match between him and the crime sample, together with proof that he lived and worked in
the general area where the rape took place. The victim, having originally told police that she
had a good view of her attacker and that she remembered him clearly, did not identify
Adams in a lineup. At the committal proceedings, she testified that he did not look like her
description of her attacker; she stated that Adams looked to be in his forties while her at-
tacker was in his early twenties. At trial, Adams testified that he had spent the whole of the
night in question with his girlfriend, who corroborated his alibi.
75. Part C of the Appendix shows that, assuming that Matcher is just as likely, apart from
the DNA evidence, as every other member of the population to be the source of the crime
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Second, even if the evidence in the two cases, the non-DNA evi-
dence as well as the DNA evidence, is comparable, it may appear to
have greater weight in the confirmation case than in the trawl case.
Suppose that in the confirmation case the police compile a powerful
case against Matcher, based on circumstantial evidence and eyewit-
ness identification, and only at the end of their investigation con-
duct the DNA test. And suppose that in the trawl case the police,
having identified Matcher as a suspect only through a database
search, focus their inquiries with such success that they are able to
compile the same circumstantial and eyewitness identification evi-
dence. In such a case, it may be plausible that the subsequently
discovered evidence was tainted by suggestiveness, given that the
DNA match motivated the police, and possibly witnesses as well, to
confirm the suggestion that the perpetrator had been found.76
These possibilities mean that the confirmation and trawl cases
will not necessarily look the same, even assuming that the DNA
evidence in the two is of a match with the same profile. But these
are factors that a jury, aided by the arguments of counsel, can easily
take into account. It is not hard, for example, for a defense attor-
ney to argue, "Except for this DNA evidence, the prosecution does
not have a shred of evidence against my client. And the prosecu-
tion's own expert acknowledged, that there could well be several
other people in the world with the same DNA." Similarly, defense
counsel could argue, "The police and the eyewitnesses were hungry
to find the perpetrator. After they got this DNA match, naturally
they constructed a case to fit the hypothesis of my client's guilt."
No technical expertise is necessary to make these arguments, and
no adjustment in presentation of the DNA evidence is required.
These factors may, however, account in part for the intuitive sense
of some observers - including the NRC committees! - that the
probative value of a DNA match is weakened by the fact that it is
found after a database search. It is not that the DNA evidence is
scene sample, then the posterior odds that he is the source are R/N. Part C of the Appendix
also shows that, for databases relatively small compared to the suspect population, these odds
are much lower than the posterior odds in the confirmation case, even if the prior odds that
Matcher is the source in that case are not very much greater than for other members of the
population.
76. See Lempert, Some Caveats, supra note 11, at 319. Of course suggestiveness can cut
both ways. In the confirmation case, the non-DNA evidence can create suggestiveness that
might cast doubt both on subsequently discovered non-DNA evidence such as an eyewitness
identification (if, for example, the police suggest that they have "got the man") and, given
that the DNA test is performed by humans at the behest of the authorities, on the DNA
evidence itself. We mean only to point out that the possibility of suggestiveness might
weaken the force of the non-DNA evidence more in a given trawl case than in a comparable
confirmation case.
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weakened, we have argued; rather, it is possible that the other evi-
dence in the case is weaker by virtue of the fact that identification
from a database trawl has led to it.
2. The Posterior Odds in the Trawl Case
Now we will examine more closely the bottom line, the poste-
rior odds - that is, the odds of the proposition at issue after all the
evidence is considered - in the trawl case. Under Bayes's Theo-
rem, as discussed above, these odds equal the prior odds times the
likelihood ratio. Consider the highly schematized case in which all
members of the suspect population are considered equally likely,
apart from the DNA evidence, to be the source of the crime sam-
ple. Then, if testing of D + 1 samples yields exactly one match, that
of Matcher, with that sample, and N persons in the suspect popula-
tion remain untested, the posterior odds that Matcher is the source
of the sample are
RIN. (3)
Ironically, the NRC likelihood analysis yields the same result.77
This is because in this situation its two basic errors - focusing on
the wrong hypothesis and failing to recognize the nature and weight
of the DNA evidence - cancel each other out in determining the
posterior odds.
Why is this so? The key proposition, we have said, is that
Matcher is the source of the crime sample, and the evidence is that
his sample, and none others of those tested, matched that sample.
Under the NRC likelihood ratio approach, the key proposition is
that the source of the crime sample is someone represented in the
database, and the evidence is that exactly one such person
(Matcher) had a sample matching the crime sample. Given that
Matcher, and nobody else tested, matched the crime sample, the two
propositions, that Matcher is the source and that someone in the
database is the source, are identical. Thus, if the calculations are
performed properly - and we do not suggest that the NRC or its
supporters miscalculate - the posterior odds must be the same
under the NRC's likelihood ratio analysis and under our own. In
effect, what the NRC has done is to use too high a prior probability
- because it uses an excessively broad hypothesis - and to com-
77. See Stockmarr, supra note 11, at 11. Stockmarr says the posterior odds are kl(N -n)p,
where k is the number of matches, N the population, n the size of the database, and p the
random match probability. For one match, this is identical to our RIN.
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pensate by using a relatively small likelihood ratio that does not
fully reflect the value of the evidence.
But if the bottom line, the posterior probability, is the same
under either approach, does that mean that the debate is just a tem-
pest in a teapot, an academic disputation with no real-world signifi-
cance? Not at all. For one thing, we note parenthetically that it is
only when the crime sample matches exactly one sample in the
database, that of the eventual defendant, that the two propositions
are identical. Of much greater practical importance, as we will now
show, the NRC likelihood approach inevitably leads to flawed pres-
entation of the evidence.
By definition, the prior odds have nothing to do with the DNA
evidence; they are the odds that Matcher is the source of the crime
sample as assessed apart from the DNA evidence. The expert
presenting the DNA evidence therefore cannot, and should not, ad-
vise the jury on those odds. Presumably, in considering the non-
DNA evidence, the jury is focusing on the ultimate issue before it:
(1) "How probable is it that this defendant committed the crime?"
And as part of their consideration of that issue, the jurors presuma-
bly consider the appropriate subsidiary issue:
(2) "How probable is it that this defendant was the source of the sam-
ple found at the crime scene?"
Presumably the jurors do not consider - because it is not part of
the case - the question posed by the NRC:
(3) "How probable is it that someone represented in the database was
the source of the sample found at the crime scene?"
What the expert can and should be advising the jury of is how
the DNA evidence affects the odds on Question (2). In doing so,
she should advise them of the likelihood ratio of the DNA evi-
dence, or its components - that is, how probable it is that the
DNA evidence would arise if Matcher were the source of the sam-
ple as compared to how probable it is that the evidence would arise
if he were not. If instead the expert advises them of how the DNA
evidence affects Question (3), she will be providing advice on an
issue not before the jury. If, as appears likely, the jurors take the
advice as bearing on Question (2) - because that is an issue that
they should consider - then they will treat the evidence as far
weaker than it really is.
In short, the expert's job is to advise on only half of the whole
picture, and it is that half that the NRC likelihood analysis short-
changes.
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E. Presentation
We have touched above on, and will now consider more fully,
the matter of presentation - that is, the issue of how the evidence
should be presented to the jury in a way to convey full and accurate
information and to minimize the chances of confusion.
We have assumed that it is appropriate in the confirmation case
for the prosecution expert to report the match probability. 78 In the
trawl case, the expert might testify in similar terms to the same
probability; our analysis has shown that no adjustment to that
probability is necessary. Thus, the expert might say:
The crime sample matches a sample that was taken from Matcher.79
The probability that a sample taken from an arbitrarily chosen mem-
ber of Defined Population would match the crime sample is 1 in R.
78. See supra section I.B.
79. This phrasing does not indicate when the sample was taken from Matcher. This is
sometimes preferable, because revealing that the sample was taken before suspicion was cast
on Matcher in this case, or that his profile was part of a database on file with the police,
might suggest that he had a previous criminal record. Cf. Commonwealth v. Claffey, 400
A.2d 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (emphasizing that jury did not learn that defendant was ar-
rested after a fingerprint comparison proved positive, and thus had no reasonable basis for an
inference of prior crime).
If the defendant's prior record is apparent to the jury anyway, there should be no prob-
lem. Cf. State v. Lozano, 588 P.2d 841, 842-43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("Any prejudice was
removed ... when appellant testified in his defense and admitted a prior felony conviction
that adequately explained the existence of the master [fingerprint] file card."); People v. Gar-
fin, 428 N.E.2d 697, 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). Also, the defendant may affirmatively wish the
jury to know that the DNA identification was made before the police had any other signifi-
cant evidence against him, so that he can argue that the other evidence was tainted by sugges-
tion from the DNA identification. Cf State v. Montgomery, 461 S.E.2d 732, 738-39 (N.C.
1995) (ruling that defendant opened the door to evidence concerning date of fingerprinting).
Even absent factors such as these, there is some reason to allow the prosecution to indi-
cate, without flourishes gratuitously suggesting a prior record or its nature, that the defend-
ant's profile was part of a database. This allows the prosecution to tell a coherent story of
how the defendant's profile came to be compared to that of the crime scene sample. Further-
more, if the evidence that the other members of the database were eliminated as suspects is
deemed significantly probative - which probably should be so only if the database is rela-
tively large - it probably makes sense not to present the evidence as if the examination of
the defendant's profile and the database trawl were two separate operations. Cf, e.g., Garlin,
428 N.E.2d at 701 (acknowledging that fingerprint card suggested prior arrest record, but
holding that the evidence was necessary to prove identity).
The problem will probably be eased as DNA testing becomes more common, so that
knowing that the police had access to a person's profile will not necessarily suggest that he
had a prior record, or at least - as is already true in England - will not necessarily suggest
that he had previously come under suspicion for a particularly serious crime. Cf, e.g., Riley
v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 96, 99 (D. Neb. 1970) ("The mere fact that the jury knows that police
officers have taken fingerprints of a defendant does not prejudice the defense.... [TIhere
was no assertion that the petitioner had previously been charged with a crime or as to why
the fingerprint was on file. The jury could only speculate that petitioner had a record of
other crimes." And the jury was told not to speculate. So there.); People v. McGhee, 605
N.E.2d 1039, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding, in a fingerprint case, that "the mere inference
that defendant had committed some offense in the past, without some suggestion as to the
nature and circumstances of that offense, fails to rise to a level of prejudice sufficient to
overcome the obvious probative value such evidence provided in connecting defendant to
this crime"); Commonwealth v. Reiss, 468 A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. 1983) ("Where there is no
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But this statement does not convey the full extent of the DNA
evidence in the trawl case; there is also the point that a number of
possible suspects have been eliminated. Conveying this informa-
tion raises a possibility of prejudice because it might suggest that
the defendant was a contributor to a database, and this in turn
might suggest that he had a prior criminal record. 0 If the probative
value of this additional information is deemed to exceed its prejudi-
cial impact, one way of conveying the information may be to allow
the expert to add testimony in this form:
We also compared the crime sample to profiles from D other persons
that we had on file, and none of those other profiles matched that of
the crime sample.
F. The Retesting Proposal
As described in Section A, NRC I proposed that if a database
trawl produced a match with the crime sample, this fact should only
provide the basis for retesting the crime sample against a sample
from the person so identified, using additional genetic markers not
used in the original test. Thus, NRC I recommended that absent
retesting the fact of a match discovered by a database search should
not be admitted. Further, according to NRC I, assuming that the
second test also indicated a match, only the markers used in that
second test should be used in reporting the strength of the DNA
evidence. Although NRC II criticizes the retesting requirement,
such a requirement has recently been advocated by Professors
Morton - who contends, indeed, that it is a sufficient response to
the database search problems' - and Lempert.8 2 For several rea-
sons, we believe such a requirement is unwarranted.
indication... that the photographs were 'mugshots' or that they came from police files, it is
not error for a witness to testify that he identified a defendant from photographs shown to
him by police."); State v. Emrick, 282 A.2d 821, 826 (Vt. 1971) (refusing to find prejudice,
because of common knowledge that fingerprints are taken for many purposes other than in
connection with criminal proceedings).
80. See supra note 79.
81. See Morton, supra note 11, at 489. Morton agrees in principle with the analysis of
NRC I. But he expresses concern that, for the defendant to gain the benefit of the diminu-
tion of probative value that he believes is appropriate, the defendant would have to reveal
the fact that his profile was in a preexisting database, which may suggest a prior criminal
record. This issue is addressed in note 79, supra. To avoid this problem - and others as well
that are predicated on agreement with the fundamental analysis of NRC II - he advocates a
retesting requirement.
82. See Lempert, After the DNA Wars, supra note 11, at 461. Lempert, like NRC II,
believes that the probative value of evidence of a match found after a database trawl is di-
minished by the fact that, the larger the database, the more likely it is that a match will be
found even though no one profiled in the database is actually the source of the crime sample.
But then he criticizes the statistical adjustment offered by NRC II in an attempt to address
this problem - for example, he discusses incisively the problem of the all-inclusive database
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Perhaps most obviously, sometimes retesting is not feasible,
even given due diligence on the part of the authorities.8 3 It is possi-
ble to take further samples from a suspect, but the crime sample is
fixed and not renewable. A test consumes part of the sample, and
there may not be enough for a further test. This was a more serious
problem with older testing techniques; even given the availability
now of more sensitive techniques, however, it will still be a prob-
lem, albeit in a smaller and different set of cases.8 4 Further, in some
cases the sample may have become degraded over time or through
mishandling that might be deemed excusable.
This concern about the feasibility of retesting might suggest not
outright rejection of a retesting requirement but rather an excep-
tion to such a requirement. Under such a qualified requirement,
evidence of a match found after a DNA search would be inadmissi-
ble without retesting unless (1) retesting is not feasible, and (2) this
infeasibility is not attributable to the fault of the prosecution or its
agents. But even such a qualified retesting requirement is
inadvisable.
For one thing, a retesting requirement is not without costs. Ob-
viously, even in the best of circumstances, there is the expense of
the second test itself - and in other circumstances there is the cost
of administering the rule, determining whether the particular case is
one in which the absence of a second test is excusable. But the
problem goes deeper. The prohibition against using the same
markers in the two tests would make it difficult to achieve an opti-
mal solution. One possibility - withholding from the first test
good markers that would otherwise be used in it - is obviously
unattractive because it diminishes the value of the first test for all
searches. The other possibility - using an optimal number of
markers in the first test and creating a backup set of additional
- and so concludes that this solution is "a step backward" from the retesting requirement of
NRC I. (Professor Lempert was a member of the Committee that produced NRC I.)
83. See NRC II, supra note 10, at 134 ("If the amount of DNA in the evidence sample is
too small, following the recommendation in the 1992 report could leave too few additional
loci for computing a match probability or LR."). The problem, where it exists, is substan-
tialy the same - insufficient additional DNA for a second test - whether the same or
additional loci are used.
84. Any testing technique requires a minimum amount of DNA for it to work satisfacto-
rily. This minimum amount is much smaller for more modern techniques than for older ones.
But whatever the threshold may be for a given technique, there will be some cases in which
the available DNA is barely above the threshold. In such cases, the first test will exhaust the
DNA, leaving little or none for a second test. In other words, the increased sensitivity of
modem tests shrinks the category of cases in which one test is possible but not two; as com-
pared to previously, that category now includes cases involving smaller initial amounts of
DNA. Even assuming that increased sensitivity shrinks that category to a smaller number of
cases, it does not eliminate the category altogether.
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markers for a second test sufficient to yield strong evidence on its
own - creates a substantial burden on laboratories; it is expensive
to develop satisfactory markers, and there is not a surfeit of ap-
proved markers available.85
Some additional expense for the creation of substantially better
evidence can be a worthwhile tradeoff, especially in a serious crimi-
nal case. 6 But courts should be wary of excluding DNA evidence
on the grounds that better evidence would be possible. There is no
limit to that logic, which would apply to all DNA testing, not only
to identifications made after a database trawl. If using twelve
markers is good, using thirteen is better - and fourteen better yet.
But if the prosecution is satisfied to use a given piece of evidence,
which is very probative and not plagued by defects that the defense
cannot explain to the jury, the evidence should not be excluded on
the grounds that the prosecution might have produced better evi-
dence yet. The defense can, if it wishes, point out limitations of the
evidence and opportunities the prosecution did not explore.
Perhaps most fundamentally, then, retesting in the trawl case
should not be required because it is unnecessary. The DNA evi-
dence in that case suffers no defect as compared to evidence of a
match determined after a one-to-one comparison; indeed, as we
have shown, the trawl result is somewhat better evidence. Exclud-
ing the proffered evidence in hopes of inducing the production of
better evidence may be justifiable when there is some defect in the
proffered evidence, or for some other reason the gap in quality be-
tween the proffered evidence and the other evidence is very great.
But it is an altogether different, and unsatisfactory, matter to ex-
clude the proffered evidence because its probative value has not
been properly analyzed.
If a retest is conducted, and it confirms that the suspect's DNA
matches that of the crime sample, the problem remains of what
85. Note, for example, the discussion of quality assurance and quality control in NRC II,
supra note 10, at 76-78, (among other things endorsing the recommendations of NRC I, supra
note 8, at 104-05, for thorough testing before implementation in casework). To gauge the
extent of effort necessary to validate one particular collection of markers, see R. Sparkes et
al., The validation of a 7-locus multiplex STR test for use in forensic casework (I): Mixtures,
ageing, degradation and species studies, 109 INrL. J. LEGAL MED. 186 (1996); R. Sparkes et
al., The validation of a 7-locus multiplex STR test for use in forensic casework (II): Artefacts,
casework studies and success rates, 109 INTL. J. LEGAL MD. 195 (1996). In the words of Dr.
Peter Gill, Head of Research at the United Kingdom Forensic Science Service and one of the
authors of these papers, the development of a system of satisfactory markers involves "many
person-years of work." Personal Communication with Peter Gill (Aug. 1998).
86. For a modem advocacy of the "best evidence" principle as the force behind much of
evidentiary law, see Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. Rnv. 227
(1988).
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should be reported to the jury. NRC I takes the view that only the
results of the second test should be reported. But this solution dis-
cards perfectly useful evidence - the results of the first test - that
the jury should be allowed to evaluate. Plainly, the fact that both
the first and the second tests produced a match between the suspect
and the crime sample - and that none of the other profiles re-
viewed in the first test did so - is more powerful evidence than
proof of the second test alone.
III. SOURCES OF DIFFICULTY: STATISTICAL AspIRATIONS TO
SCIENCE AND UNDUE JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
In Part II, we have contended, contrary to the NRC reports and
some distinguished scholars who have supported them, that the pro-
bative force of a DNA match is not weakened by the fact that it was
made only by virtue of a database trawl. If we are right, and in this
Part we will assume that we are, then the question arises of how
such a flagrant error has been made. We have already suggested
one pair of reasons - that the probative value of the other evi-
dence in the case may be weakened by the fact that the DNA match
has been discovered through a trawl, and that the total weight of
the evidence may be less in a trawl case than in a comparable con-
firmation case. In this Part, we suggest other, deeper reasons. We
explore both the habits of mind of statisticians that make them
prone to errors of the type we have discussed here, and a judicial
tendency towards deference that diminishes the ability of courts to
make good use of statistical and scientific evidence.
A. Classical Statistics and the Aspiration to Objectivity
1. The Classical Statistical Model
Science aspires to objectivity, to the demonstration of proposi-
tions that are not dependent on the subjective views of the ob-
server.87 Accordingly, it is highly dependent on experiments in
which given sets of conditions are observed many times. By count-
ing or measuring different consequences in different conditions, a
scientist can hope to draw conclusions on the associations between
conditions and consequences.
87. See, e.g., Larry Laudan, Why do (natural) scientists agree?, in INTERPREn~o THE
WORLD 89 (William R. Shea & Antonio Spadafora eds., 1992). Although controversy re-
mains among philosophers of science over the extent to which such objectivity is attainable,
we do not intend to address this issue here. For our purposes, the general aspiration of
science towards objectivity is the critical point.
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Accordingly, classical statistics grew up to facilitate objective in-
ferences from data. Classical statisticians try to avoid subjective
judgments, seeking instead to determine what conclusions can be
drawn solely on the basis of frequency of observation. The Baye-
sian approach - updating the odds assigned to a given proposition
in light of evidence subsequently received - is thus unacceptable
to classical statisticians because it depends on the subjective assign-
ment of odds in the absence of objectively measurable data. In-
stead, the classical statistician, having selected a hypothesis to be
tested but without having assigned any probability to that proposi-
tion, observes whether the results of an experiment are of a highly
unusual nature assuming the truth of that proposition. If they are,
then the statistician concludes that the hypothesis can be rejected.
Often the statistician works by indirection; the "null hypothesis,"
the hypothesis to be tested and perhaps rejected, is the negation of
the hypothesis the statistician is hoping to confirm.
Under this approach, great caution must be exercised in testing
several different hypotheses in the same experiment. The reason is
that the more different kinds of observations are made, the more
likely it is that some of the observations will be unusual in nature,
even though in fact nothing remarkable has happened. Take an il-
lustration adapted from one offered by NRC II. Suppose we have
some reason to hypothesize that a coin is biased towards heads, and
to test this we toss it in the air five times, with all five tosses landing
heads up. This provides some basis to reject the hypothesis that the
coin is fair, because this result would occur in only about three per-
cent of all repetitions of the experiment with a fair coin.", But now
suppose we hypothesize that each of ten coins might be biased to-
wards heads, and we toss each of the ten five times. If one or more
of the coins lands heads up on all five tosses; the classical statisti-
cian maintains that this provides no good reason for concluding that
such coins are biased; in approximately twenty-seven percent of all
repetitions of this experiment with ten fair coins, at least one coin
will land heads up on all tosses.89 Given 100 coins, it is virtually
certain that at least one will land heads up on all five tosses - even
though all 100 are perfectly fair.
88. More precisely, in 1/2', or 1/32, of all repetitions.
89. The probability that a given fair coin will land heads up on all 5 tosses is 1/32, so the
probability that it will not is 31/32. Accordingly, the probability that none of 10 fair coins
tossed independently will land heads up on all 5 tosses is [31/32]1", which equals approxi-
mately 73%.
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For the same reason, the classical statistician is very reluctant to
draw proof of a proposition from a set of observations unless the
observations have been made with the proposition (or its negation)
articulated beforehand as a hypothesis to be tested. Given enough
observations, it is highly likely that some unusual ones will turn up,
even though no surprising causal factor is at work; the one-in-100
longshot comes in a winner about one time in 100, and when it wins
that does not mean that anything suspicious has happened. It is
considered bad science to trawl data, looking for surprising results
and then proclaiming that the data proves a proposition that would
likely lead to such results. At best, such unusual results help iden-
tify a hypothesis to be tested. New observations, perhaps from a
new experiment, are then necessary to test the truth of that
hypothesis.
We will not attempt here to evaluate how well this classical sta-
tistical model performs the job for which it was designed, aiding the
interpretation of data in scientific inquiry; that is a broad and con-
troversial issue beyond the scope of this Article.90 Rather, we will
argue that the NRC approach to the database search problem re-
flects the classical statistical method and that this is an inappropri-
ate method for resolving such problems in the distinctive setting
created by adjudication.
2. The NRC's Classical Orientation
That the NRC approach reflects the classical method is rather
obvious on the face of the reports. NRC I emphasized that with a
database trawl "one does not start with a single hypothesis to test
(i.e., that the evidence was left by a particular suspect), but instead
fishes through the databank, trying out many hypotheses." 91 Thus,
no conclusion could be drawn from the fact of a match produced by
the trawl; instead, the match "should be used only as the basis for
further testing using markers at additional loci."92 In other words,
the initial match yielded by the search identifies the hypothesis to
be tested, and nothing more. Though NRC II did not recommend
the same solution, its analysis of the problem was very similar. Its
reference to the teachings of "standard statistical logic" in a coin-
toss experiment is revealing: In one experiment, a heads up toss of
each of twenty coins is so unusual that it supports rejection of the
90. See generally JOHN EARmAN, BAYES OR BusT (1992); GmRD GIGERENZER ET AL.,
THE EMPiRE OF CHANCE (1989).
91. NRC I, supra note 8, at 124.
92. See id. at 129; supra text accompanying note 38.
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null hypothesis that the coins are all unbiased. But if the experi-
ment is repeated a large number of times, an all-heads-up result on
at least one trial proves nothing because given enough trials it is
unsurprising that some of them will have unusual results. And this
analogy, NRC II maintained, was on point for the database search
problem, because the more profiles searched the greater the chance
of finding one that matches the crime sample purely by coincidence.
3. Conflict with the Needs of the Legal System
The enterprise of law is very different in several ways from the
scientific enterprise for which the classical statistical model was
developed.
a. Nonrecurrence and The Need for Decision. In serving sci-
ence, the classical statistical method seeks to ascertain recurrent
patterns, using observations about occurrences in the past to predict
the future. The future is infinite, and so science is, in the main,
patient; a scientist following the dictates of classical statistical meth-
ods will not draw a conclusion until she is confident she can do so.
Adjudication, by contrast, usually seeks to determine the truth
about a particular dispute, which usually concerns events in the
past. The job of a jury - which we will use as a shorthand for
adjudicative factfnders - is not to draw general conclusions about
a run of cases, but rather to determine the truth of the dispute
before it. It must do so, as best it can, on the basis of the informa-
tion legitimately before it; it cannot decline to decide because it
does not have sufficient information. The inertial decision - leav-
ing matters where they stand - does not simply leave matters open
for resolution another day. Rather, it is a final decision against the
claimant who sought to alter the status quo. And in making its de-
cision, the jury can rely to a limited extent, if at all, on information
about other events, because the case before it is a non-recurrent
event that is almost certainly unique in some material respect.
b. Subjectivity. In part because of the non-recurrence of liti-
gated disputes, adjudicative fact-finding does not usually purport to
depend on objective assessment of quantitative data. Most of the
evidence presented to juries is not in quantified form. Hence, the
legal system expects juries to make subjective assessments of the
evidence. It recognizes that different juries might rationally make
substantially different assessments of a given body of evidence. 93
93. Thus, although an American court in a civil case has the power to throw out a verdict
as against the great weight of the evidence, if the case goes to the jury then a verdict for
either side will usually be upheld. See, e.g., 'Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 55 (1949)
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Thus, the legal system embraces subjectivity, for it has no other
choice. And this means that, while the system does not usually
have the opportunity of relying on quantified data, it is not shackled
by the necessity of doing so. In other words, a jury is expected to
make its subjective assessment of the probability of a proposition at
issue on the basis of all the information legitimately available to it.
Differences in this base of information will therefore reasonably
lead to different assessments of such probabilities. Indeed, the
standard definition of relevant evidence is "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. ' '94
The need for subjectivity applies to investigators, or inquisitors,
as well as to jurors. Near the beginning of the investigation, when
he may have no primary suspect in mind, the investigator must in
effect treat as a suspect everybody in the world capable of commit-
ting the crime. He must, however, make subjective assessments -
some persons will be far more likely suspects at the outset than
others - and must continually adjust those assessments as he re-
ceives new information. If the investigator learns information
strongly pointing to one person, the proposition that that person
was the perpetrator immediately becomes of interest, even if the
prior probability of that proposition appeared very low.
c. Pre-Set Issues and Information. A jury is relatively passive, in
two interrelated senses. First, to a substantial extent the proposi-
tions at issue are identified before the case is presented to the jury.
In a criminal case, a particular crime or set of crimes is at issue, and
a particular defendant or set of defendants is on trial. Thus, in a
one-defendant trial, if the jurors are persuaded beyond a reason-
able doubt that the alleged crime was committed, their question is
not, "Who did it?" but rather, "Did the defendant do it?" 95 Sec-
ond, for the most part, the jury cannot demand the production of
more evidence to test hypotheses that it finds of interest; it must do
the best it can with the evidence presented to it and the knowledge
("This Court has previously held in many cases that where jury trials are required, courts
must submit the issues of negligence to a jury if evidence might justify a finding either way on
those issues.").
94. FED. R. EviD. 401.
95. The presumption of innocence demands that, before the presentation of evidence, the
jury assign a very low probability to the proposition that the defendant was the perpetrator;
in particular, the jury must not allow the fact that the prosecution has chosen to bring charges
against the defendant, alone among all other people on earth, to elevate that probability.
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it is allowed to bring into the deliberation room. A jury has very
limited capacity to experiment.
This latter point applies, though perhaps with less force, to in-
vestigators (or inquisitors) as well. An investigator does have some
ability to select a hypothesis and then search for evidence that will
tend to confirm or disprove it, and sometimes he can even create an
experiment that will do so. But in most cases the investigator in-
quires about events in the past. This means that for the most part
his job is not to create new information, but to discover, assemble,
and interpret the information that is available.
d. Summary. The classical statistical approach is unsuited for
analyzing DNA evidence in the context of litigation. The problem
facing an investigator or a juror is not to determine a general law of
the universe. Rather, the investigator must try to determine who
committed a given crime on a given occasion; the juror's job is even
narrower, seeking to determine whether a given person, on whom
its attention has been focused, committed the crime. Subjective as-
sessment, in light of all the information legitimately before them, is
essential in allowing both the investigator and the juror to perform
their jobs properly. Sufficiently strong evidence may reasonably
lead to the conclusion that a given person (whether or not previ-
ously identified as a particular source of suspicion) is the perpetra-
tor even though the prior probability of that proposition seemed
very low. Once the case is presented to the jury, the jury cannot
decide it lacks the information to draw a conclusion, nor that it
wants to perform an experiment to ascertain the facts: It must
make its best assessment of the facts on the basis of the information
within its purview. Thus, where the evidence tends to show that the
person who left a particular DNA sample at a particular place is
probably the perpetrator, it becomes of importance to the jury
whether the defendant is the source of that sample. The jury should
compare how likely the DNA evidence would arise if the defendant
were the source to how likely it would arise if he were not the
source. And the jury should combine these assessments with its
subjective assessments of all the other evidence in the case to assess
the probability of guilt.
B. The Law as Consumer of Forensic Science
We have, we think, shown why statisticians are prone in a trawl
case to provide the adjudicative system with the answer to the
wrong question. But why does the legal system appear to be ready
to accept that advice? The answer, we believe, lies in a longstand-
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ing tendency of the adjudicative system to defer to the scientific
establishment.
Courts have long been afraid that juries will fall prey to "junk
science. ' 96 Thus, they have demanded that an expert witness's
opinion be in accordance with a theory that has achieved some
threshold level of reputability. For most of this century, the domi-
nant statement of this idea was the one in Frye v. United States, that
the underlying "scientific principle or discovery.., from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. '97
Some states still adhere to the Frye test.98 But many jurisdic-
tions have justifiably come to the conclusion that its demand for
"general acceptance" by the relevant scientific community as a pre-
condition to admissibility is too stringent. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702, which has been adopted in many states, supports this
view. That Rule provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.99
In 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,100 the
United States Supreme Court held unanimously that the "austere
standard" of Frye is incompatible not only with the language of
Rule 702 but also with the liberal nature of the Rules in general.10'
A majority of the Court went beyond this ruling, however, and at-
tempted to articulate the "gatekeeping role" that the judge must
play when "[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony."' 02
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority expressly limited
this discussion to evidence based on scientific knowledge, as op-
posed to "technical, or other specialized knowledge," because that
was the nature of the expertise offered in Daubert itself. 0 3 Justice
Blackmun put great emphasis on Rule 702's use of the term "scien-
96. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991).
97. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
98. See, e.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (declining to follow Daubert and
continuing to apply California's version of Frye, commonly referred to as Kelly-Frye); People
v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995).
99. FED. R. EvrD. 702.
100. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
101. 509 U.S. at 589.
102. 509 U.S. at 597, 592.
103. 509 U.S. at 590 & n.8.
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tific ... knowledge" and operated from the premise that, to qualify
as scientific knowledge, "an inference or assertion must be derived
by the scientific method. 10 4 Thus, he attempted to articulate indi-
cia of the scientific method, and he laid out four criteria that should
often enter into determining "the scientific validity" of the princi-
ples underlying the evidence. These may be referred to as (1) test-
ing, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rates and standards,
and - partially resurrecting Frye just a few pages after its apparent
death - (4) general acceptance.10 5
Our concern here is not so much with the much debated ques-
tions of whether Daubert reflects good philosophy of science, or
even whether it reflects good evidentiary policy.10 6 Rather, the
point of significance here is that, though Daubert reflects a loosen-
ing of the demands purportedly applied under Frye, it still reflects a
notable attitude of deference to the scientific establishment. This
attitude is apparent in several respects. Most obviously, perhaps, is
the continued use of "general acceptance" as a criterion - albeit
no longer the exclusive one - for determining admissibility. Fur-
ther, the other criteria constitute an adoption of currently prevalent
scientific methods; the emphasis on peer review and publication
also relies heavily on the attitudes of, and decisions made by, the
scientific establishment. Perhaps most fundamentally, the entire in-
quiry seems gratuitous. Under the language of Rule 702, nothing
seems to depend on whether the knowledge on which the opinion is
based is "scientific" or not. "[S]cientific" and "technical" are
clearly listed merely as illustrations of "specialized knowledge"; the
key question seems to be whether the opinion is based on "special-
ized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue."' 0 7
The bite of Daubert's insistence on scientific methods was
demonstrated recently in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.'08 There,
the plaintiff attempted to show that exposure to PCBs, a class of
chemicals, could promote cancer. He presented the results of four
104. 509 U.S. at 590.
105. 509 U.S. at 592-95.
106. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74
TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1995); Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good
Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 803 (1997).
107. FED. R. Evm. 702. Justice Blackmun did purport to focus on the "helpfulness" stan-
dard - but he did so by melding that issue into the one of scientific validity. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 591-92 ("Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to
the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.").
108. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
February 1999]
Michigan Law Review
studies, each of which failed on its own to provide strong support
for this conclusion. One of his experts, a toxicologist named David
Teitelbaum, testified - somewhat ungrammatically, but compre-
hensibly enough - at a deposition:
[A]s a toxicologist when I look at a study, I am going to require that
that study meet the general criteria for methodology and statistical
analysis, but that when all of that data is collected and you ask me as a
patient, "Doctor, have I got a risk of getting cancer from this?" That
those studies don't answer the question, that I have to put them all
together in my mind and look at them in relation to everything I
know about the substance and everything I know about the exposure
and come to a conclusion. I think when I say, "To a reasonable medi-
cal probability as a medical toxicologist, this substance was a contrib-
uting cause,".., to his cancer, that that is a valid conclusion based on
the totality of the evidence presented to me. And I think that that is
an appropriate thing for a toxicologist to do, and it has been the basis
of diagnosis for several hundred years, anyway.10 9
Justice Stevens agreed with Dr. Teitelbaum that "[i]t is not in-
trinsically 'unscientific' for experienced professionals to arrive at a
conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidence - this is not
the sort of 'junk science' with which Daubert was concerned."" 0
But Justice Stevens stood alone. The rest of the Court upheld the
trial court's decision that expert opinions like this one did not rise
above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation.""' A trial
court, concluded the majority, could validly decide to exclude "evi-
dence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."' 12
The fear of junk science - the concern that juries will be over-
whelmed by chicanery masquerading as science - has thus exerted
a powerful effect on the American courts. And perhaps a fear of
their own inadequacy to separate the wheat from the chaff has led
them to rely greatly on the attitudes and methods of the scientific
establishment. We do not mean to deny that a "gatekeeping role"
for the courts is necessary; we assume that some evidence offered
under the guise of science is of so little value, and of sufficient prej-
udicial potential, that exclusion is warranted. But we believe that
deference to the scientific establishment in an attempt to fend off
junk science may create another problem - failure to recognize the
109. 118 S. Ct. at 522 n.4 (quoting David Teitelbaum).
110. 118 S. Ct. at 522 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. 118 S. Ct. at 516.
112. 118 S. Ct. at 519.
[Vol. 97:931
DNA Database Searches
extent to which, as we have suggested in Section A of this Part, the
needs of the legal system do not match up with the methods ordina-
rily used by scientists.
The Joiner majority's castigation of the toxicologist's opinion as
"subjective belief' reflects this failure. Adjudication, we have ar-
gued, depends on subjective assessments of factual issues, and
courts are fooling themselves if they pretend otherwise.113 Some-
times, scientists can present to the jury generalized propositions of
the type that they try to demonstrate in their ordinary, non-forensic
work. But adjudication usually depends on the particulars of the
case at hand.
Often this means that the law needs to decide non-recurrent
matters for which, because it is impossible to run a controlled ex-
periment or even to gather data across like cases, the scientific
method will be useless. And yet, in such cases scientifically-based
information may be useful in trying to determine the facts. The
subjective belief of an expert who has had extensive experience in
dealing with problems of a roughly similar nature may be particu-
larly useful in bridging the gap between those principles and the
available evidence. This is often the case, for example, in cases in
which an engineer offers an explanation for an accident that is simi-
lar in some respects to others but unique in other respects.114 Even
if the expert's opinion is not well grounded on scientific principles,
her observations and judgment, based on extensive experience, may
be useful. 115 For this reason, we agree with the orientation of deci-
sions like Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc.,116 now on review
before the Supreme Court, which treat the Daubert criteria as lim-
ited to the class of expert opinion the admissibility of which de-
pends on its being deemed to be scientific.
Even if the matter on which an expert wishes to offer an opinion
is a recurrent one, so that science can in time yield an answer with
113. See, e.g., Evn-rr & WEmr, supra note 13, at 240-41.
114. But see, e.g., Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996)
(applying Daubert criteria, over plaintiffs' protests that the expert's testimony was to matters
of basic engineering), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997). Cf Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit
No. 16, 66 F.3d 940, 943-44 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Daubert to psychological evaluations in
child custody cases).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
that the work of forensic document examiners is not genuine science, but nevertheless admit-
ting an opinion as a non-scientific one in a case of forgery detection because it could help the
jury in focusing on minute similarities and dissimilarities between two documents that lay-
people might have missed).
116. 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Car-
michael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
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confidence, science may not be ready to do so before the legal sys-
tem needs guidance. Unlike scientific inquiry, Justice Blackmun
pointed out in Daubert, law "must resolve disputes finally and
quickly"; evidentiary rules are "designed not for the exhaustive
search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolu-
tion of legal disputes." 1 7 But the Court seems to have failed to
realize the implications of that perspective. It does not weigh in
favor of excluding scientific evidence, or of deferring to the scien-
tific establishment, but rather in favor of recognizing that the law
must satisfy its own needs for scientific advice, even if doing so does
not square with the usual methods of scientists.' 8
In any case, if a scientist is doing more than reciting general
principles without an attempt to relate them to the facts of the case,
the law's treatment of scientific evidence must take into account the
adjudicative context in which the evidence is offered. That context
differs significantly from the one in which scientists are used to
working - most notably, with respect to evidence of a DNA
database search, in that the jury's job is at base a subjective one and
in that the bringing of the case tends to define the propositions at
issue.
Our perspective may perhaps be crystallized by comparing it to
that of Anders Stockmarr, one of the statisticians who has written
in support of the NRC approach to the DNA database search prob-
lem. "The decision problem of the court," he has written, "should
take the implications of statistical hypotheses for data description
into account, and not the other way around."" 9 In our view, this is
precisely wrong. The legal system is a consumer of the information
offered by expert witnesses. It may be that the service needed by
the legal system requires scientists to operate in ways at variance
with their usual operating methods. The law should not be a pas-
sive consumer of scientifically based information, taking what scien-
tists have to offer "off the rack." Rather, it should be an aggressive
consumer, asking its suppliers to provide what it needs.120
117. Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
118. See Richard D. Friedman, The Death and Transfiguration of Frye, 34 JuRIMETRIcs J.
133, 147 (1994) ("[S]ometimes courts ought to be willing to allow juries to take advantage of
scientific information even when the scientific establishment is unwilling to declare a
conclusion.").
119. Stockmarr, supra note 11, at 15.
120. See generally Leiter, supra note 106, at 805, 814 (arguing that the questions "What is
the best account of scientific method?" and "What is the best criterion for judges to use in
deciding the admissibility of scientific evidence?" must be kept separate, and posing the
question of "social epistemology:" "[U]nder the real-world epistemic limits of a particular
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This perspective, which has sometimes been apparent in debates
concerning psychiatric testimony,121 may be helpful across the
range of expert testimony.122 What the law needs is not necessarily
social process for the acquisition of knowledge, what epistemic norms actually work the
best?").
121. The law sometimes attaches serious consequences to the matter of an individual's
mental condition or constitution. Where those criteria do not accora well with criteria ordi-
narily used by psychiatrists, or where the law asks psychiatrists for predictions that the pro-
fession believes cannot be made with confidence, many psychiatrists naturally chafe. See,
e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (over dissent, rejecting position of American
Psychiatric Association that psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are
too unreliable to be admissible); Statement of Dr. Lawrence C. Kolb, Director, N.Y.S. Psy-
chiatric Institute, at Second Circuit Conference, 37 F.R.D. 365, 387 '(1964) ("[Mjany of our
younger people have very little interest today in offering themselves as experts in court in
view of the constricted framework in which they believe their testimony may be cast, a frame-
work which is considered irrelevant to their areas of competence."). At times, the response
of the courts in the context of the insanity defense has been to defer, allowing testimony in
terms of criteria approved by the psychiatric profession. See, e.g., 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRImINAL LAw DEFENSES § 173(b)(3) (1984) (noting and criticizing "a common tendency to
define the mental illness disability in terms of psychiatric labels").
We do not wish to minimize the difficulties; if, for example, predictions of violence cannot
be made to an acceptable degree of confidence, then it is probably unwise to create a legal
rule that depends on such predictions. But determining what constitutes sufficient mental
capacity for a person to be held responsible for a crime is ultimately a normative judgment.
See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 983, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane) (re-
jecting the Durham rule - which asked whether the crime was the "product" of a mental
disease or defect and "was adopted in large part to permit experts to testify in their own
terms" - principally because the rule was responsible for the "undesirable characteristic...
of undue dominance by the experts giving testimony"); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d
847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en bane) ("[N]either the court nor the jury is bound by ad hoc
definitions or conclusions as to what experts state is a disease or defect. What psychiatrists
may consider a 'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes, where their concern is treat-
ment, may or may not be the same as mental disease or defect for the jury's purpose in
determining criminal responsibility."); 312 F.2d at 861 (Miller, C.J., concurring in part) ("Un-
til now, this court has allowed the shifting wind of expert nomenclature to control its deci-
sions."); RoBINsoN, supra, § 173(b)(3) (emphasizing "the community's view" as "central to
the proper operation of a system of excuses"). Psychiatrists can be enormously helpful, both
in advising on the practicality and consequences of any test and in providing information and
opinions to help apply it. At bottom, though, crafting the test is a matter of law.
122. For example, scientific experts sometimes testify that a given result is "consistent"
with a proposition at issue. See, e.g., ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, supra note 20, at 56. This
tendency may well be a result of a phenomenon on which we have commented, the hesitancy
of scientists to reach definitive conclusions. It may also reflect a habit of thinking consonant
with classical statistics, in which an analyst seeks to determine the validity of a proposition by
subjecting it to one or more tests, rejecting the proposition if it is inconsistent with the test
results. In any event, this manner of testifying is unhelpful for the law. An adjudicative
factflnder needs to know the relative likelihood of the result given the truth of the proposi-
tion at issue and given its falsity. This information is obscured by testimony in terms of
consistency.
We offer one more example from the realm of statistics. Meta-analysis is the use of for-
mal statistical techniques to provide a quantitative synthesis of multiple studies, each of
which may in itself be insufficient to yield significant results. The use of meta-analysis has
been controversial in various disciplines, see, e.g., Jack W. Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants,
18 J. LEG. MED. 133, 209 (1997). We do not wish here to suggest criteria for the use of meta-
analysis in adjudication, or to minimize the difficulties of drawing conclusions from a body of
studies that may use somewhat different methodologies. But our model of the law as an
aggressive consumer suggests that courts should probably be willing - under the necessity of
drawing the best conclusion possible given the available data - to allow inferences to be
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information processed in the usual ways of science, but rather infor-
mation that will be helpful to the jurors in making their best subjec-
tive assessment of the particular issues at stake in the case at hand.
Of course, like any consumer, the law can only ask the supplier to
provide what the supplier can. But in the implicit negotiation be-
tween law and science, the law has one advantage that most con-
sumers do not have: It sets the rules.123
CONCLUSION
We have argued here that the NRC, and those who have sup-
ported it, have erred in denigrating the value of evidence of a match
found after trawl of a DNA database. This is an issue likely to be of
great importance with the continued growth of offender databases.
One root of the problem, we believe, is the classical statistical
orientation of many statisticians. Because of their fear of testing
multiple hypotheses, a fear based on the use of statistics in a sup-
posedly objective manner for scientific inquiry, they focus on the
wrong question, asking how the DNA evidence alters the
probability of the proposition that the source of the crime sample is
profiled in the database. Instead, they should ask how the DNA
evidence alters the probability of the proposition that the person
identified by the trawl was the source. And the adjudicative system
seems ready to accept this mistaken analysis because of a habit of
deference to the scientific establishment borne out of a fear of junk
science. If the courts would recognize that what they need from
science is not the usual output of the scientific community, but
rather a special product more tailored to adjudicative needs, they
may better play the role of aggressive consumer, and so better se-
cure information that will be of help to the trier of fact.
drawn from meta-analyses under criteria that in non-forensic contexts would appear unduly
lax.
123. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics,
11 YALE L. & POL. REv. 1 (1993). Schuck "advocate[s] a criterion of cultural competence for
allocating decisional authority over multi-cultural issues," id. at 3, and cautions:
Scientists must remember that it is lawyers and politicians who formulate the public
rules for our complex society. Lawyers must remember that the project of science de-
mands, and generally deserves, a kind of freedom to which legal controls will often be
inimical. Politicians must remember that science ... is to some irreducible degree an
elite enterprise that cannot flourish under the incubus of a militant populism.
1d. at 46.
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APPENDIX
To highlight some of the points made in the text, this Appendix
presents an informal mathematical discussion of a simplified model
of inferential problems arising from DNA evidence. 124
Assume that in both the confirmation and trawl cases the crime
sample and the sample taken from Matcher have the same DNA
profile, and that the probability that any person arbitrarily chosen
from the suspect population will have that proffle is p. 2 5 We will
disregard complexities created by relationships among members of
the population, and the possibility of error in handling or analyzing
the evidence.
A. The Likelihood Ratio in the Confirmation Case
In the confirmation case, the forensic scientist could report the
match probability p. Another way of phrasing it, in numbers
greater than rather than less than one, is to say that the random
match probability is "1 in R," where R equals 11p. The likelihood
ratio is also very simple. The numerator is the probability that the
evidence of a match would arise if Matcher were the source of the
crime sample. That probability, under the simplifying assumptions
we have made, is 1. The denominator is the probability that the
evidence of a match would arise if Matcher were not the source of
the crime sample. That probability, under the simplifying assump-
tions we have made, is p. The likelihood ratio is therefore lip, or R.
B. The Likelihood Ratio in the Trawl Case
Now consider the trawl case. There is a database consisting of
samples taken from D + 1 persons, and in addition to those people
anyone within a suspect population of N people might have been
the source of the crime sample. Assume that, before the database is
trawled, all people represented in the database are deemed equally
likely to be the source of the crime sample, that all members of the
suspect population not represented in the database are deemed
equally likely to be the source, and that any given person repre-
sented in the database is deemed m times more likely than any
124. For analyses of more complex and general versions of the problem, see Balding &
Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence, supra note 13, and Balding & Donnelly, Infer-
ence in Forensic Identification, supra note 13.
125. In reality, learning information about the profiles of some members of the popula-
tion gives new information bearing on the probability that any other member of the popula-
tion will have the profile in question. We will disregard this complexity for purposes of this
discussion.
February 1999]
Michigan Law Review
member of the population not represented in the database to be the
source. The database is then trawled, and only one sample, that of
Matcher, matches the profile of the crime sample. We can now cal-
culate the likelihood ratio for this case.
The numerator, again, is the probability that the evidence would
arise if Matcher were the source of the crime sample. But now the
evidence is not simply that Matcher's profile matches that of the
crime sample; it is also that the other D samples do not match the
crime sample. The probability that Matcher's profile would match
that of the crime sample, given that he is the source of that sample,
is again 1. The probability that any given proffle of an innocent
person in the database would not match that sample by chance is
(1 - p). Under the simplifying assumptions we have made, the
probability that none of the D profiles in the database other than
Matcher's would match the crime sample if Matcher is the source of
the sample is therefore
(1 - p)D. (Al)
Given the certainty that Matcher's sample would match that of the
crime sample if he is indeed the source of that sample, this expres-
sion is the numerator of the likelihood ratio.
Now we must determine the denominator of the likelihood ra-
tio, which is the probability that the evidence would arise if
Matcher were not the source of the crime sample. This is somewhat
more complicated because we must take into account two basic pos-
sibilities - (1) that the source was someone other than Matcher
represented in the database, and (2) that the source was a member
of the population not represented in the database. Before the evi-
dence of the trawl is received, the first of these possibilities appears
mD/N times as likely as the second. These two possibilities must be
weighted in this proportion in determining the probability that the
DNA evidence would arise if Matcher were not the source. That
probability is therefore
mD x Pr(EISd) + N x Pr(EISp) (A2)
mD +N
where Pr(E I Sd) is the probability that the evidence would arise if
someone other than Matcher represented in the database were the
source of the crime sample, and Pr(E I Sp) is the probability that the
evidence would arise if someone in the suspect population but not
represented in the database were the source.126
126. In general, if H equals (H or H 2), and H, and H 2 are mutually incompatible,
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Pr(E I Sd) is easy to determine. It is 0, for if the source were
someone represented in the database other than Matcher, it would
be impossible for the evidence - that Matcher and no one else in
the database matched that sample - to arise.
Pr(E I Sp) measures the probability that, if someone not repre-
sented in the database were the source of the crime sample, (1)
Matcher's profile would match that of the crime sample by chance
and (2) none of the other profiles D in the database would do so.
Because we are assuming that these two events are independent,
the probability of their conjunction is the product of the individual
probabilities. The first of these individual probabilities is p, the ran-
dom match probability. The second is (1 - p)D, the same as (Al).
Thus, Pr(E I S) equals
p(l _ p)D. (A3)
From (A2), the denominator of the likelihood ratio therefore
equals
0 + N x p(l - p) (A4)
mD + N
The likelihood ratio equals (Al) divided by (A4), which simpli-
fies by elementary algebra to
lip x (1 + mD/N). (A5)
Because R is defined to be lip, this simplifies further to
R x (1 + mD/N), (A6)
which is Expression (2) in the text. Expression (A6) has a simple
interpretation: It may be rewritten as R x (N + mD)IN, and so is
equivalent to R divided by the probability, as assessed before the
Pr(E I = c x Pr(E I H,) + Pr(EIH,) (Ani)
c+1
where c = Pr(H)IPr(H2). In the case being discussed here, c = mD/N; substituting for the
general terms and multiplying numerator and denominator by N therefore yields Expression
(A2).
Equation (Ani) can be derived by recognizing that Pr(H) x Pr(E I H) = Pr(E and H), that
Pr(H) = Pr(H) + Pr(H2), and that Pr(E and H) = Pr(E and H) + Pr(E and H2). Thus, we
have
Pr(E I H) = Pr(E and HI) + Pr(E and H2)
Pr(HI) + Pr(H2) (An2)
The numerator of the fraction on the right side of Equation (An2) may be rewritten as
[Pr(H,) x Pr(E I H1)] + [Pr(H2) x Pr(E I H2)]. Making this substitution, dividing numerator
and denominator by Pr(H), and substituting c for Pr(H)IPr(H2), yields Equation (An1).
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database search, that the source of the crime sample is not in the
database given that Matcher is not the source.127 This latter factor
reflects the evidentiary value of the fact that the database search
has eliminated as the possible source of the crime sample everyone
represented in the database but Matcher.
C. Posterior Probabilities
Assume that, before the DNA evidence is received, every per-
son represented in the database appears equally likely as each other
to be the source of the crime sample, and every member of the
suspect population not represented in the database appears equally
likely as each other to be the source. Then the prior odds that
Matcher is the source are
m/(mD + N). (A7)
The posterior odds equal the prior odds times the likelihood ratio,
or Expression (A6) times Expression (A7), which simplifies to
Rm/N, (A8)
and to
RIN (A9)
on the assumption that m = 1, so that every member of the suspect
population is as likely as every other, absent the DNA evidence, to
be the source of the crime sample.
Now compare this last variation of the trawl case to a confirma-
tion case, in which the prior odds that Matcher is the source of the
crime sample are deemed to be
x/(D + N). (AlO)
That is, Matcher is perceived to be x times as likely as the "aver-
age" member of the suspect population to be the source of the
crime sample. Because the likelihood ratio in the confirmation case
is simply R, the posterior odds are
xR/(D + N). (All)
127. For a more general derivation, see Balding & Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile
Evidence, supra note 13, at 607.
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Expression (All) is greater than Expression (A9) whenever
xI(D + N) > 1/N,12 or
x > I + (D/N). (A12)
If D is small in relation to N, then x has to be barely greater
than 1 for Expression (A12) to hold. Even if D is as large as N, x
has to be only greater than 2 - meaning that, absent the DNA
evidence, Matcher has to appear only twice as likely as the average
member of the population to be the source - for the posterior
probability to be greater in the confirmation case than in the trawl
case.
In speaking of the posterior odds in this analysis, we mean the
odds assessed right after receipt of the DNA evidence. It is possible
in the trawl case, of course, that the identification of Matcher will
lead to other evidence that may raise those odds further.
D. The NRC Analysis
The analyses above have taken into account the fact that the
profile matching the crime sample is that of a particular person, the
one who thereby becomes of interest if he was not already. Now,
for comparison, we will summarize, in terms similar to those used
above, the likelihood ratio analysis of the trawl case offered by
NRC II. Mistakenly, in our view, this analysis takes as the proposi-
tion at issue the generalized one that the source of the crime sample
is someone represented in the database. It then assesses the likeli-
hood ratio with respect to this proposition of the limited informa-
tion that within the database there was exactly one match of the
crime sample.
The numerator of this likelihood ratio is the probability that, if
the source were someone represented in the database, exactly one
profile in the database would match that of the crime sample. The
source would certainly match. The probability that none of the
other D samples would match is the same as (Al), (1 - p)D.
The denominator of this likelihood ratio is the probability that,
if the source were someone not represented in the database, exactly
128. In xl(D+N), which is multiplied by R to form the posterior odds in the confirmation
case, the numerator of x reflects the elevated prior odds, while the denominator of (D+N)
reflects the fact that the DNA evidence has not eliminated any other suspects. By contrast,
in 11N, which is multiplied by R to form the posterior odds in the variant of the trawl case
being considered here, the numerator of I reflects prior odds that did not distinguish Matcher
from the rest of the population, while the denominator of N reflects the fact that the DNA
evidence has eliminated D alternative suspects.
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one profile in the database would match that of the crime sample.
For any given sample, the probability that that sample, and no other
samples in the database, would match the crime sample is p(I -p)',
the same as (A3). Because there are D + 1 samples in the database,
the aggregate probability that one, and only one, profile in the
database will match that of the crime sample, given the hypothesis
that the source is actually somebody not represented in the sample,
is therefore
(D + 1) xp(1 -p)D. (A13)
The likelihood ratio is therefore
1
p x (D + 1) (A14)
or
R
D +1 (A15)
which is Expression (1) in the text.
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